Proponents of multiple memory systems argue that two separable and functionally distinct memory systems mature at different rates during the 1st year of life. The core argument of this article is that even very young infants behave like adults with normal memory on memory tasks thought to distinguish these systems.
Support for the popular assumption that two different memory systems mature at different rates during the 1st postnatal year is based on the large number of empirical dissociations in the memory performance of aging adults with amnesia and patients with Korsakoff's syndrome on various priming and recognition-recall tests in response to manipulations of different independent variables. These dissociations initially led to inferences about functional dissociations of the cognitive processes and the neural mechanisms that underlie them which, in turn, led researchers to propose a number of dichotomous memory systems. ~ The proposed systems include episodic and semantic memory (Kinsbourne & Wood, 1982; Tulving, 1972 Tulving, , 1983 , the habit system and the memory system (Bachevalier & Mishkin, 1984; Hirsh, 1974) , reference and working memory (Honig, All research from my laboratory and the preparation of this article were supported by National Institute of Mental Health Grants R37-MH32307 and K05-MH00902.
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carolyn Rovee-Collier, Department of Psychology, Busch Campus, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to rovee@rci.rutgers.edu. 467 1978), horizontal and vertical associative systems (Wickelgren, 1979) , procedural and declarative memory (N. J. Cohen & Squire, 1980; Squire, 1987) , early-developing and late-developing systems (Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) , implicit and explicit memory (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1987) , semantic and cognitive memory (Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1982) , and taxon and locale systems (Jacobs & Nadel, 1985; Nadel, 1992) . All of these share the assumption that the memory system that is spared by amnesia (e.g., implicit or procedural memory) is primitive and functional very early in the course of human development, whereas the memory system that is impaired by amnesia (e.g., explicit or declarative memory) is higher level and becomes functionally mature late in the 1st postnatal year. Because the implicit and explicit memory systems seem to be the most widely accepted dichotomy, in what follows, I focus on them.
Contrary to the assumption that the memory system of very young infants is exclusively implicit, evidence amassed from a large number of studies that were conducted over the past 25 years reveals that very young infants display experimental dissociations in memory performance that exactly mirror the memory dissociations displayed by adults with normal memory on analogous tests in response to manipulations of the same independent variables. This evidence disputes claims that implicit and explicit memory follow different developmental time lines and challenges the utility of conscious recollection as the defining Not only has the number of memory systems been debated, but so has the question of whether multiple memory systems even exist (J. R. Anderson & Ross, 1980; Baddeley, 1984; Craik, 1983; Hintzman, 1984; Jacoby, 1984; Johnson, 1992; G. Mandler, 1985 G. Mandler, , 1989 McKoon, Ratcliff, & Dell, 1986; Olton, 1989; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; Snodgrass, 1989; Tulving, 1985) . One of the best known alternatives to multiple memory systems holds that memory deficits result from a discrepancy in the processing operations required at study and at testing; conversely, evidence of memory is found when these operations match (Roediger, 1990; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987) . characteristic of explicit memory. It seems unlikely that any simple dichotomy could adequately characterize a process as complex as memory, even during the infancy period. Should a dichotomy eventually prove to be the most satisfactory account, then at a minimum, both implicit and explicit memory must be viewed as primitive systems that are simultaneously functional very early in development.
The Development of Memory Systems: The Argument For many years, preverbal infants were thought to be incapable of retention for longer than a few seconds or minutes at most (for review, see Werner & Perlmutter, 1979) . The capacity for long-term memory was assumed not to emerge until late in their 1st year (e.g., Kagan & Hamburg, 1981; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) . In retrospect, this assumption is not surprising. It was based on data collected using visual attention measures in a variant of the delayed matching-to-sample paradigm: the traditional paradigm used to measure short-term memory in rats (Roberts, 1972b (Roberts, , 1974 , pigeons (Grant & Roberts, 1973; Roberts & Grant, 1976; Shimp & Moffitt, 1974; Zentall, 1973) and monkeys (D'Amato, 1973; Jarrard & Moise, 1971; Jarvik, Goldfarb, & Carley, 1969) . Recently, however, paradigms using motivated infants have yielded evidence that even very young infants can retain information about the events in which they participated for weeks, months, and sometimes even years (Hartshorn et al., in press; Hayne, 1990; Hitchcock & RoveeCollier, 1996; Myers, Clifton, & Clarkson, 1987; Myers, Perris, & Speaker, 1994; Perris, Myers, & Clifton, 1990; RoveeCollier, 1990) .
Paradoxically, the disparity between these two sets of findings has not been explained in terms of a paradigm shift but by attributing the very excellent retention of younger infants to an early-maturing memory system that is characterized as being independent of and functionally different from a late-maturing memory system, which is presumed to become functional near the end of the 1st year (Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) . The hypothesis that two separable memory systems mature at different rates during the 1st postnatal year is now widely accepted as fact (Bachevalier, 1990; Bachevalier & Mishkin, 1984 ; J. M. Mandler, 1990; McKee & Squire, 1993; Naito & Komatsu, 1993; Parkin, 1989; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984; Tulving, 1983; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) . Most scientists probably believe that there is empirical evidence for the conclusion that different systems mediate the retention of different types of acquired knowledge at different points in development, but there is none. Instead, the sole evidence for two, functionally distinct memory systems that follow different developmental timetables has come from studies of aging individuals with amnesia, patients with Korsakoff's syndrome, and monkeys with brain lesions, whose brain damage presumably impairs the late-maturing system but spares the early one. In a much-cited article entitled, "The Development of Procedural Memory" (McKee & Squire, 1993) , for example, participants ranged from 49 to 77 years of age, and their mean age was 63 years! Just as there are obvious differences between human infants and monkeys with brain lesions, however, there are also vast differences between infants and the aging adults with amnesia and patients with Korsakoff's syndrome with whom they have been compared. Infants, for example, have yet to develop language and the vast networks of associations and experiences that" adults with amnesia have acquired over the course of a lifetime. Moreover, infants are not brain-damaged. Although the attempt to apply the Jacksonian principle of the hierarchical development and dissolution of function to the hierarchical development and dissolution of memory is intuitively appealing (Naito & Komatsu, 1993) , it is untenable in the absence of supporting evidence (Campbell, Sananes, & Gaddy, 1984) .
Experimental Dissociations in Adult
Memory Performance
Experimental dissociations in adults' memory performance on direct tests (e.g., recall and recognition tests), which are thought to require awareness or conscious recollection, and indirect tests (e.g., priming tests), which are not, are the cornerstone for the assumption that there are two separable memory systems (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985; Squire, 1987; Vriezen, Moscovitch, & Bellos, 1995) . Tulving (1983) described the rule of experimental dissociation as follows:
Dissociation is said to have occurred if it is found that the manipulated variable affects subjects' performance in one of two tasks, but not in the other, or affects the performance in different directions in the two tasks. Thus, dissociation refers to the absence of a positive association between dependent variables of two different tasks. (p. 73 ) He suggested that an analogous logic could be applied to studies of developmental or pathological dissociations, with the performance of groups differing in age or pathology being compared on two tasks.
One of the earliest reported memory dissociations was, in fact, of the latter type: Warrington and Weiskrantz (1970) administered free recall and recognition tests as well as two priming tests (word-fragment completion involving degraded letters and stem-completion tests) to an institutionalized group of brain-damaged patients with amnesia and a control group of patients without brain damage. The memory performance of patients with amnesia was impaired on the recall and recognition tests but not on the priming tests. Since then, individuals with amnesia have exhibited preserved learning on a variety of other indirect tasks, including word-fragment completion, word completion, lexical decision, perceptual decision, spelling of homophones, preference judgments, free association of related information, and word completion with new associates (for review, see Shimamura, 1986) but not on direct tasks (Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Moscovitch, 1982; Shimamura & Squire, 1984;  for review, see Shimamura, 1986) .
Memory dissociations on recall-recognition tasks versus on various priming tasks were subsequently documented in adults with normal memory, who performed differently when instructed either to recollect a prior specific episode (usually the study episode) or to make no reference to a prior episode, respectively (Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Schacter, 1987 ; for review, see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988) . These findings gave impetus to the view that individuals with amnesia were capable of initially encoding information but had difficulty subsequently in gaining awareness of it (Crowder, 1988) . G. Mandler (1989) , for example, referred to the inability of the patient with amnesia "to use access routes to information that is not available automatically" (p. 96) .
A number of criticisms have been levied at inferences of different memory systems from differential performance on indirect and direct tasks. For one, the tasks that are used to measure memory performance and the forms (processes) of memory thought to underlie performance on those tasks are often treated as equivalent. A measurement per se, however, is neither an underlying process nor a particular form of memory (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger & McDermott, 1993) . As Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, and Java (1994) noted, "these dichotomies all obscure important distinctions between different mental states and processes that may occur in direct and indirect test performance" (p. 2). In addition, empirical dissociations on direct and indirect tests of memory reflect only task distinctions, and implicit memory tasks often contain an explicit component and vice versa (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Rajaram, 1993) . As Jacoby ( 1991 ) observed, Most past investigations of automatic (unconscious) influences of memory or perception assumed a one-to-one mapping between processes and tests. The drawing of conclusions, then, requires that tests be factor-or process-pure with regard to the type of processing they measure. A difficulty for identifying processes with tasks is that tasks are probably never process pure .... That problem is not fully solved by finding task dissociations between manipulations or between subject populations and type of test. (p. 531 )
Common Distinctions Between Implicit and Explicit Memory
The characteristics that distinguish implicit from explicit memory are presented in Table 1 . 2 Central to the distinction between these systems--and the distinction that is most often invoked--is the role of consciousness, that is, whether retention is with conscious awareness or not. Today, conscious recollection is almost universally accepted as the defining characteristic of explicit memory that distinguishes it from implicit memory. According to Schacter (1989) , "Explicit memory is roughly equivalent to 'memory with consciousness' or 'memory with awareness.' Implicit memory, on the other hand, refers to situations in which previous experiences facilitate performance on tests that do not require intentional or deliberate remembering" (p. 356). Likewise, according to J. M. Mandler (1984) , "in all adult studies the term 'recognition' implies consciousness or awareness of prior occurrence. It is assumed that the adult is aware that the item in question has been experienced in his or her personal past" (p. 77). Subsequently, she wrote, "This dissociation suggests a dual memory system, one that is automatic in operation and not accessible to conscious report, and another whose contents can be brought to mind and thought about" (J. M. Mandler, 1990, p. 487) .
Any distinction between memory systems that is based on evidence of conscious awareness, however, is untenable from developmental and comparative perspectives. Whether or not a preverbal infant or an animal is consciously aware of having previously experienced a previous episode (Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) or has a sense of "pastness" (J. M. Mandler, 1984; Tulving, 1983 ) cannot be directly tested but is solely a matter of philosophical speculation (see also Shapiro & Olton, 1994 ). Yet, this distinction has become the primary basis for concluding that preverbal infants and animals have an implicit memory system only (e.g., Bauer, 1996; J.M. Mandler, 1984 J.M. Mandler, , 1990 McDonough, Mandler, McKee, & Squire, 1995; McKee & Squire, 1993; Naito & Komatsu, 1993; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) . 3
Memory Procedures Used With Preverbal Infants
The majority of studies of long-term memory with preverbal infants have used the mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm. This paradigm overcomes the fact that prelinguistic infants lack a verbal response to indicate whether or not they recognize a test stimulus by teaching them a motoric one--an operant footkick--that they can subsequently use for this purpose. In this paradigm, infants learn to kick to move a crib mobile. The critical to-be-remembered information is either displayed directly on the sides of the mobile or in the context (e.g., on cloth panels draped over the sides of the crib or playpen) in which training occurs. In the standard procedure, 2-and 3-month-old infants receive a 15-min training session with a particular mobile on each of 2 consecutive days. Each session consists of an initial 3-min nonreinforcement period, a 9-min reinforcement period, and a final 3-min nonreinforcement period. At 6 months, training sessions are one third shorter and consist of an initial 2-min nonreinforcement period, a 6-min reinforcement period, and a final 1-min nonreinforcement pe- Table 1 Frequently Cited Distinctions Between Implicit and Explicit Memory riod. (The duration of the final nonreinforcement phases at each age is too brief to permit extinction.) During each reinforcement period (the acquisition phase), the infant's ankle is connected to the mobile suspension hook (see Figure 1A) , and kicks move the mobile at a rate that is proportional to their vigor and rate ("conjugate reinforcement"; Rovee & Rovee, 1969) . During the nonreinforcement periods, the ribbon is moved to a second empty hook while the mobile remains in place. In this arrangement, the infant can view the mobile but cannot activate it by kicking. The nonreinforcement period at the outset of Session 1 is the baseline phase when the infant's unlearned kick rate (operant level) is measured; the nonreinforcement period at the end of Session 2 is the immediate retention test phase, when the infant's final level of learning (kicks/minute) is measured after zero delay. Only infants whose kick rate exceeded their baseline rate by 1.5 times in 2 of 3 consecutive min during an acquisition phase (the learning criterion) are subsequently tested for retention.
All infants also receive a long-term retention test that is procedurally identical to the baseline and immediate retention test phases. The long-term retention test lasts 3 min at 2 and 3 months of age and 2 min at 6 months of age. During the test, a mobile that is either the same as or different in some way from the training mobile is simply suspended over the infant while the ankle ribbon is attached to an empty hook, and the infant's kick rate is again measured. Following the long-term test, reinforcement is reintroduced as a control procedure to insure that infants who performed poorly during the test were not unmotivated, fatigued, or ill at that particular time.
Infants " t e l l " us whether or not they recognize the test mobile Figure 1 . In A, the experimental arrangement in the mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm during an acquisition phase with a 3-month-old. The infant moves the mobile by using the ankle ribbon that is strung to the hook suspending the mobile. During the delayed-recognition test, the arrangement is identical except that the ribbon is attached to the "empty" stand. In B, the experimental arrangement during a reactivation treatment with a 3-month-old. One end of the ribbon is attached to the mobile hook, and the other end is drawn and released by an experimenter at the side of the crib. The infant seat minimizes incidental activity during the procedure. Figure 2 . In A, schematic of the delayed-recognition task, training, and the long-term retention test (i.e., the delayed-recognition test). In B, schematic of the reactivation task, showing training, the reactivation treatment, and the long-term retention test. The only difference between these tasks is the brief reactivation (priming) treatment prior to the long-term retention test. The memory probe in A serves as the reminder or memory prime in B, and the final long-term retention test is usually with the original training stimulus.
in terms of their responding during the long-term retention test.
If infants recognize the test mobile, then they say " y e s " by kicking at a rate higher than their individual baseline rates; if they do not recognize the test mobile, then they say " n o " by not kicking above their individual baseline rates.
The Delayed-Recognition Task
In the delayed-recognition procedure, a specified amount of time (e.g., from 1 min to 42 days at 3 months of age) is allowed to elapse after the end of training, and then the long-term retention test, described above, is administered (see Figure 2A) .
By using different types of retrieval cues as memory probes after different delays during the delayed~recognition test, it is possible to ascertain which attributes (e.g., attributes representing specific details or general features, individual features or feature relations, the focal cue or the context, etc.) are accessible in the original memory representation and which are not at different points in time following original encoding. This strategy has revealed that infants forget different kinds of memory attributes at different rates Boiler, Rovee-Collier, Gulya, & Prete, 1996; Muzzio & Rovee-Collier, 1996; Rovee-Collier, Adler, & Borza, 1994; ; see also Riccio, Ackil, & Burch-Vernon, 1992) . Similarly, by using different types of retrieval cues as memory probes at different points in time following a reactivation treatment, we have determined that reminders also recover different kinds of memory attributes at different rates (Hayne & Rovee-Collier, 1995; Hitchcock & Rovee-Collier, 1996) .
Although infants' operant levels do not change systematically over the first 18 months of life, operant levels can vary considerably from one infant to another. Therefore, long-term retention is measured in terms of two relative measures of individual performance rather than absolute response rate. The primary measure, the baseline ratio (B/P), indicates whether or not a particular group exhibited retention. It expresses the extent to which each infant's kick rate during the long-term retention test (B) exceeds that same infant's pretraining response rate during the baseline phase (P). A mean baseline ratio significantly greater than a theoretical population baseline ratio of 1.00 (i.e., no retention) indicates significant retention. The second measure, the retention ratio (B/A), provides information about the degree of retention after delays at which retention was significant. This ratio expresses an infant's kick rate during the longterm retention test (B) as a fraction of the same infant's final level of learning (A), as measured during the immediate retention test at the end of training. A retention ratio of 1.00 or greater indicates that performance is the same during the longterm test as it was at the end of training (i.e., no forgetting). A mean retention ratio significantly less than a theoretical population retention ratio of 1.00 indicates significant forgetting.
The Reactivation Task
The reactivation task 4 is interpolated between training and the long-term retention test (see Figure 2B ) and is used to 4 The reactivation procedure was originally developed with animals (Spear & Parsons, 1976) as a variant of the reinstatement procedure (Campbell & Jaynes, 1966) , and we adapted it for use in the mobile paradigm Sullivan, 1982) . The term reinstatement refers to the empirical manipulation of experimentally reinstating the external conditions of the original training event at the time of reminding. (It is misused when a memory or a response is described as "reinstated," e.g., Bauer, 1996) . Reactivation refers to the theoretical process by which an inactive or inaccessible memory is internally primed or reactivated (Spear & Parsons, 1976) . In the reinstatement procedure, recover all or part of the original memory that has been forgotten at the time it is administered. In this task, the infant is briefly exposed to a memory prime or reminder (see Figure 1B) that is a component of the original stimulus complex that was present during training (e.g., the original mobile or the original context). The reminder presumably primes or reactivates the dormant or latent memory attributes, thereby increasing their accessibility. Whether or not the original memory attributes were reactivated is confirmed later, during the long-term retention test. If the reactivation procedure was successful, then infants exhibit excellent retention on the ensuing test; if it was not successful, then infants exhibit no retention, behaving as if they had received no reminder at all. During a reactivation treatment with a mobile reminder, the infant is placed in a sling seat to minimize movement, and a mobile that is either the same as or different from the training mobile is suspended in front of the infant. One end of a ribbon is then attached to the same hook as the mobile, and the other end is held by the experimenter, who uses it to move the mobile for 3 min (2 min at 6 months of age) noncontingently at the same rate that the infant had previously kicked to move it in each of his or her final 3 (or 2) min of training. In this way, movement of the reminder mobile is phenomenologically equivalent to what each infant had witnessed during the final minutes of acquisition. During a reactivation treatment with a context reminder, the infant is simply placed in the crib or playpen for 3 (or 2) min in a context that is either the same as or different from the context that was present during original training. In both conditions, when the 3 (or 2) min have expired, the infant is removed from the crib or playpen, and the reactivation treatment is over.
The ensuing long-term retention test is usually conducted with the original mobile or in the original context. Under these circumstances, a reminder that is novel differs from both the training stimulus and the test stimulus; however, only the discrepancy between the reminder and the original training stimulus is responsible for the infant's memory deficit on the subsequent long-term retention test. My colleagues and I have repeatedly shown that this deficit occurs because the novel reminder never recovered the memory in the first place (Hayne & Rovee-Collier, 1995; Muzzio & Rovee-Collier, 1996 ; see Rovee-Collier & Hayne, 1987 , for review).
a partial training trial is periodically repeated throughout the retention interval; in the reactivation procedure, an isolated component of the original event (e.g., the cue, the context) is presented only once, at the end of the retention interval.
Infant Memory Tasks That Are Analogous to Implicit and Explicit Memory Tasks Used With Adults
The two different memory tasks that have been used with preverbal infants are analogous to indirect and direct memory tasks that have been used with adults (see Table 2 ). Specifically, the reactivation task is analogous to the priming task that has been used in studies of implicit memory with adults, where priming is also thought to reactivate or increase the accessibility of a memory representation. Likewise, the delayed-recognition task corresponds to yes-no and old-new recognition tasks that have been used in studies of explicit memory with adults. Even though infants are widely believed to have only a single (implicit) memory system, these two infant tasks yield memory dissociations that exactly parallel the memory dissociations that are found with adult tasks and that are attributed to two (implicit and explicit) memory systems.
Comparison of Priming and Reactivation Tasks
In studies with adults, priming tasks are described as implicit memory tasks on which the effects of prior experiences are manifested through changes in subsequent task performance without the need for the conscious recollection of specific prior episodes (Graf & Schacter, 1985 ) . Priming refers to the facilitative effect on retention of the prior presentation of an item (Tulving & Schacter, 1990) . This facilitative effect is presumably mediated by a memory system separate from that involved in performance on explicit or direct tests such as recall and recognition. According to Vriezen et al. (1995) , A tacit assumption of a multiple memory systems account of priming is that the mere presentation and processing of an item is sufficient to leave a trace in the perceptual representation system (Schacter, 1990 (Schacter, , 1992 Tulving & Schacter, 1990) . It is the reactivation of this trace on subsequent presentations that accounts for the repetition priming effect" (p. 944).
In Jacoby's ( 1991 ) process-dissociation framework, priming refers to the automatic or unintentional retrieval of previously encoded information.
The reactivation task is based on observations that many memories that are forgotten (i.e., individuals display no evidence of retention during a long-term retention test) can subsequently be recovered. Apparently, these memories remain available in the long-term store long after they can no longer be accessed by the retrieval cues that are presented at the time of the long-term retention test. The distinction between the availability and the accessibility of memories was originally made by Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) . Like priming tasks used with adults, reactivation tasks are used with infants to reveal the effects of prior experiences that otherwise would not be exhibited. These effects are also manifested through changes in subsequent test performance. In both priming and reactivation tasks, participants are initially exposed to the target information. Subsequently, they receive a memory prime as a retrieval cue, followed by the retention test (a prior-cuing procedure; Spear, 1978) .
The similarity between the priming task used with adults and the reactivation task used with infants has been noted by several researchers (J. M: Mandler, 1984; Naito & Komatsu, 1993; Nelson, 19955) . Primes used with adults are thought to activate either a preexisting memory representation (Tulving & Schacter, 1990) or a representation established by a single exposure to a stimulus (Musen & Treisman, 1990) , and they do so as the result of a sin~gle, brief presentation (Naito & Komatsu, 1993) . The same is true of memory primes used with infants.
In addition, item-specific priming effects occur with adults whether or not they actually recognize the item. Similarly, in studies with infants, a reminder is presented only after infants have forgotten the training memory--they do not recognize the prime at the time it is presented. G. Mandler (1985, pp. 94-96) described reminding in adults as a nondeliberate effort to recall a previously experienced event. This characterization is equally descriptive of reminding in infants. Not only is a reminder presented only after forgetting is complete, but also evidence that it has recovered the forgotten memory at 3 months of age does not surface until at least 8 hr after the reminder presentation, and all of the memory attributes are not recovered until 72 hr afterwards (Fagen & Rovee-Collier, 1983 ) . At 6 months of age, evidence that the reminder has recovered the forgotten memory does not appear until 1 hr after the reminder presentation, and all of the memory attributes are not recovered until 4 hr afterwards (Boiler, Rovee-Collier, Borovsky, O'Connor, & Shyi, 1990) . This long recovery latency, even at 6 months, is evidence that memory reactivation in infants occurs automatically, without an active search component (BoUer et al., 1990; Fagen & RoveeCollier, 1983 ).6 That is, memory retrieval in reactivation tasks cannot involve a motivated search process because infants have no memory of what they might be searching for at the time they are reminded.
Finally, for both infants and adults, effective primes are hyperspecific. In reactivation studies, only reminders that strike a fairly veridical match with the original memory representation can reactivate it--a generalized reminder is not effective (for review, see Rovee-Collier & Hayne, 1987) . Thus, for example, if the mobile that is used as a reminder contains more than a single object that was not present on the training mobile, then it does not recover the memory, which remains forgotten (RoveeCollier, Patterson, & Hayne, 1985) . This is one reason that we view memory reactivation as a relatively pure, perceptual identification task. Similarly, any change in the physical appearance of an item between study and testing reduces the amount of priming for adults (Tulving & Schacter, 1990 ; for review, see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988) . This veridicality requirement is consistent with propositions that relate involuntary, automatic processing on priming tests to brain mechanisms that analyze perceptual information (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Musen & Treisman, 1990; Richardson-Klavehn et al., 1994; TuNing & Schacter, 1990; Vriezen et al., 1995) .
This absolute veridicality requirement can be overridden by reminding infants with a mobile on which a unique target item is embedded in the midst of a number of homogeneous distractors. This type of stimulus array produces a perceptual phenomenon akin to visual pop-out in adults (Julesz, 1984; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Gormican, 1988) in that the unique item captures the infant's attention. When this occurs, infants treat the reminder mobile as if it were composed entirely of items like the unique one, and the perceptual match is made or not solely on the basis of a comparison between the unique target and the contents of long-term memory (Rovee-Collier, Bhatt, & Chazin, 1996; Rovee-Collier, Hankins, & Bhatt, 1992) . In adults, visual pop-out is viewed as a preattentive phenomenon in which perceptual processing occurs automatically and in parallel, without focused attention (Treisman, 1988) . The same may be said of memory reactivation in infants.
Comparison of Recognition and Delayed Recognition Tasks
Yes-no recognition tests (e.g., Dorfman, Kihlstrom, Cork, & Misiaszek, 1995) and old-new recognition judgments (e.g., Mitchell & Brown, 1988; Musen & Treisman, 1990) are two of the benchmark tasks used to index explicit memory in studies with adults. The delayed-recognition task that is used in mobile studies with young infants is analogous to these standard yesno and old-new recognition tasks. In both tasks, participants initially study the designated material and then, after a predetermined retention interval has elapsed, are presented with a retrieval cue during the recognition test (a contemporaneous-cuing procedure; Spear, 1978) . Bower, 1995, p. 86 ) characterized infants' memory performance in all mobile studies as "only procedural" 7 because infants initially learn the recognition response during an operant conditioning procedure (see also Bauer, 1996; Bauer & Hertsgaard, 1993; J. M. Mandler, 1984 Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) . The mobile training procedure, however, is used solely as a means of providing preverbal infants with an alternative way to indicate whether or not they recognize the test cue. Moreover, because they learn the response prior to the introduction of the different experimental manipulations that distinguish the memory reactivation task 5 Nelson (1995) described memory performance on delayed-recognition tests in the mobile paradigm as visual recognition but did not distinguish it from memory performance in a reactivation paradigm. Although he drew a tentative analogy between responding in the mobile task and classically conditioned leg flexion in studies with cats (Voneida, Christie, Bogdanski, & Chopko, 1990 ) and rats (Caldwell & Werboff, 1962; Stehouwer & Campbell, 1978) , he acknowledged that the analogy might be inappropriate. Indeed, the mobile paradigm involves purely voluntary responding rather than elicited or reflexive responding as in classical conditioning, and infants' memory performance reflects the informational content of the particular test display rather than a motor skill, such as how to perform the target response.
The relatively protracted period between priming and recognition in very young infants may reflect their lack of extensive networks of associations that facilitate and speed processing in older children and adults and the immaturity of central integrative pathways (including a lack of myelinization) that speed memory processing and increase its efficiency (see also Kesner, 1980) . Given the sharp decrease in recognition latency following priming between 3 and 6 months of age, one would expect recognition to become increasingly faster with age. It is not surprising, therefore, that priming effects in adults are immediate.
7 This description may reflect a misunderstanding of our procedure: Bauer and Hertsgaard (1993) characterized "procedural memory" as being evidenced by savings during relearning and cited infants' memory performance in mobile studies as an example. However, savings are not measured; the measure of long-term retention in mobile studies is taken during a nonreinforcement period, hence it cannot reflect relearning. from the delayed-recognition task, differential performance in these two tasks cannot be attributed to how the response got into the infant's behavioral repertoire in the first place. Even verbally proficient children and adults at one time had to learn the labels for the stimuli with which they are subsequently tested in implicit and explicit memory tasks. Researchers give no thought to how these verbal labels were initially acquired because that information is irrelevant in accounting for adults' subsequent performance on implicit versus explicit memory tasks. Whether the recognition response is verbal or motoric or was initially acquired by using a conditioning procedure, observation, or verbal instructions, the memory dissociations exhibited by preverbal infants, children and adults with normal memory, and individuals with amnesia on priming and recognition tasks are the same.
Independent Variables That Produce Task Dissociations
in Studies With Adults Table 3 lists 13 independent variables that produce memory dissociations on tasks commonly used to distinguish implicit and explicit memory in studies with individuals with amnesia. In the following, I present evidence that these same variables produce the same dissociations in the memory performance of very young infants, who presumably lack an explicit memory system, on reactivation (priming) and delayed-recognition tasks. The bulk of the infant data that are presented in this section was compiled from numerous, separate studies that were conducted in my laboratory and the laboratories of my former students over the last 25 years. Those who would argue that the evidence of infant memory dissociations that is presented next reflects only dissociations within a single (implicit) memory system cannot logically use evidence of these very same dissociations in adults with normal memory and those with amnesia as support for the existence of two different memory systems.
Age
As Tulving ( 1991 ) put it, "The neural pathways that subserve episodic remembering, maturing late in childhood and deterio- Proponents of multiple memory systems universally hold that the order in which memory systems disappear in aging adults and adults with brain damage predicts the order of their initial appearance during infancy (Naito & Komatsuk, 1993; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984; Tulving & Schacter, 1990 ). This hypothesis, originally proposed by John Hughlings Jackson to describe the hierarchical development and dissolution of sensorimotor functioning (for review, see Rozin, 1976) , states that "the dissolution of mental function due to injury, disease, or aging first involves those functions which are gained last in ontogeny, while those functions preserved the longest are those which appear earliest in childhood" (Campbell et al., 1984, p. 467) . Indeed, most studies of the effect of age on performance in implicit and explicit memory tasks have found that older adults are inferior to younger adults on tasks of explicit memory, but they do not differ from younger adults on tasks of implicit memory (for reviews, see Graf, 1990; Light & Lavoie, 1993; and Mitchell, 1993) . In all of these studies, age-related deficits were found on tests of recognition and cued recall, but age differences were either much smaller or absent altogether on various single-item priming tests (e.g., Isingrini, Vazoiu, & Leroy, 1995; Java & Gardiner, 1991; Light & Albertson, 1989; Light & Singh, 1987; Mitchell, Brown, & Murphy, 1990) . Not surprisingly, investigators working with individuals at the other end of the age continuum have obtained the opposite pattern of results. On tests of explicit memory with 3-to 11-year-olds and young adults (Carroll, Byrne, & Kirsner, 1985; Greenbaum & Graf, 1989; Mitchell, 1993; Naito, 1990) , recall and recognition were found to improve with age, but the amount of priming was again virtually identical across ages. Finally, Bauer (1996) reported that 13-, 16-, and 20-month-old infants reproduced an increasing number of logically ordered events with age on an immediate cued-recall test of deferred imitation, and Barr, Dowden, and Hayne (1996) reported that 18-month-olds produced higher levels of deferred imitation after 24 hr than 12-montholds. Taken together, these studies suggest a pattern of memory performance over the life span that is described by an inverted U-shaped function for explicit memory tasks and a flat function for implicit memory tasks (Mitchell, 1993) .
As was the case with children and young adults, the memory performance of preverbal infants studied in the mobile paradigm also improves with increasing age on the delayed-recognition task but not on the memory reactivation (priming) task. Figure  3 shows that the magnitude of infants' retention in a delayedrecognition test 1 week after training increased as a function of age despite the fact that the final levels of acquisition were equivalent at all ages (Hayne, 1990; Hill, Borovsky, & RoveeCollier, 1988; Rovee-Collier, 1984; Sullivan, Rovee-Collier, & Tynes, 1979) . The same figure also shows that the magnitude of retention following a reactivation treatment that was administered 3 weeks after training was not affected by age (Davis & Rovee-Collier, 1983; Hayne, 1990; Hill et al., 1988; RoveeCollier, 1984; Rovee-Collier, Sullivan, Enright, Lucas, & Fagen, 1980; Vander Linde, Morrongiello, & Rovee-Collier, 1985) .
The dissociations in infants' memory performance in delayedrecognition and reactivation tasks are not unique to the mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm. Hartshorn and Rovee-Collier [] Recognition . . • Reactivation Rovee-Collier, 1997; Hartshorn et al., in press ). The combined data from the mobile and train tasks show that the duration of infants' retention in the delayed-recognition task increases monotonically over the first 18 postnatal months (see Figure  4 ). There is no suggestion in these data that long-term memory is suddenly enhanced at 8-9 months of age (Kagan & Hamburg, 1981 ) , changes abruptly at the end of the 1st year when the late-maturing memory system is thought to become functionally mature (Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) , or differs during the period of transition from receptive to productive language early in the 2nd year. In contrast, the magnitude of retention following a reactivation treatment remains the same over this same developmental period, irrespective of the particular task in which the priming occurs (Hartshorn & Rovee-Collier, 1997; RoveeCollier et al., 1980; Sheffield & Hudson, 1994) . Figure 3 . Memory performance of 2-, 3-, and 6-month-olds on a delayed-recognition test (striped columns) 1 week after training and on a reactivation test (filled columns) 3 weeks after training. (A retention ratio of 1.00 or greater indicates no forgetting from the immediate to the long-term test.) Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Davis & Rovee-Collier, 1983; Hill, Borovsky, & Rovee-Collier, 1988; Rovee-Collier, 1984; Rovee-Collier, Griesler, & Earley, 1985; RoveeCollier, Sullivan, Enright, Lucas, & Fagen, 1980 .
Retention Interval
A basic observation of human memory is that retention on standard recognition, cued-recall, and free-recall tests declines with the passage of time (Wickelgren, 1972; Woodworth, 1938) . In contrast, priming effects are long-lasting in adults and children with normal memory (Komatsu & Ohta, 1984; Mitchell & Brown, 1988; Naito, 1990; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982) and individuals with amnesia (Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993; Tulving, Hayman, & Macdonald, 1991 ) . q'hlving et al. (1982) , for example, primed adults with words and found that their memory performance on a word-fragment completion test was stable over a period of 1 (1997) taught 6-month-olds how to move a miniature train around a circular track by lever-pressing and obtained identical delayed-recognition and reactivation data after the same test and reminder delays described earlier ( Figure 3 ) for 6-month-olds who were studied in the mobile paradigm. Likewise, Sheffield and Hudson (1994) obtained a parallel dissociation on cuedrecall and reactivation tests with 14-and 18-month-olds who had been trained to perform six distinct activities during a single visit to a laboratory playroom. On the cued-recall tests, 14-month-olds forgot the initial training event sooner (after 8 weeks) than 18-month-olds (after 10 weeks). Once forgetting was complete, all infants received a reactivation treatment during which the experimenter modeled three of the original six activities. During the standard cued-recall test 24 hr later, infants were tested for retention of the remaining (unmodeled) three activities. This time, the magnitude of retention was equivalent in the two age groups. Note that the latter dissociation on the cued-recall and reactivation tests was identical to the dissociation that was obtained in mobile studies with younger infants, despite the fact that the younger infants had learned to produce the target response by means of a conditioning procedure, whereas the toddlers were shown how to find and use the materials for each activity and then enacted those target responses.
Delayed recognition has now been tested in the train task with independent groups of infants ranging from 6 through 18 months of age at the time of original encoding (Hartshorn & Age (Months) Figure 4 . The maximum duration, in weeks, of delayed recognition (baseline ratio > 1.00) from 2 to 18 months of age. Independent groups of infants were studied in the mobile (2-6 months) and the train (6-18 months) tasks. At 6 months of age, long-term retention was the same irrespective of task. Data are from Hartshorn & Rovee-Collier, 1997; Hartshorn et al., in press. week, whereas their performance on a yes-no recognition test declined over the same delay. Similarly, Musen and Treisman (1990) found a perceptual priming effect that remained constant across delays ranging from a few hours to 1 week, whereas recognition declined significantly across the same period of time. In the perceptual priming task, adults were briefly exposed to a series of visual patterns that they had previously studied or that were novel. After each exposure, they attempted to draw the pattern just seen. The difference in accuracy between their reproductions of previously studied and novel patterns was the measure of implicit memory. Explicit memory was measured by asking them to select which pattern of four alternatives they remembered having studied. Finally, Mitchell and Brown (1988) obtained a robust priming effect that remained stable across delays ranging from 1 to 6 weeks on a picture-naming task, whereas performance on an old-new picture-recognition task declined over the same period. The same pattern was obtained in two studies of deferred imitation with toddlers. Bauer, Hertsgaard, and Wewerka (1995) reported that the number of correctly ordered events produced by 14-month-olds immediately following a verbal reminder (a priming task) was approximately equivalent whether children were tested after 1 week or after 1 month, but children's imitation performance on a cued-recall test decreased as the retention interval increased from 1 week to 1 month. Hayne, MacDonald, and Barr (in press) likewise reported that 12-month-olds exhibited significant deferred imitation after a 2-day delay but none after a 2-week delay; they did not use a priming task.
In mobile studies with infants ranging in age from 2 through 6 months, performance in a delayed-recognition task is also affected by the length of the retention interval, but performance in a reactivation (priming) task is not. Figure 5 , for example, shows that the memory performance of 3-month-olds on a delayed-recognition test declined steadily with increases in the training-test delay (Hayne, 1990; Rovee-Coilier et al., 1980; Sullivan et al., 1979) , but the magnitude of their retention 24 hr after a reactivation treatment was the same whether the interval between training and reminding was 2, 3, or 4 weeks (Hayne, 1990; ). An identical result was obtained whether infants received one, two, or three reminders (Hayne, 1990) . Following a reactivation treatment, memory recovery appears to be an all-or-none phenomenon (see also Table  1 , "Implicit memory"). Of the 9 infants reminded 5 weeks after training, 4 exhibited perfect retention on the ensuing test, whereas 5 exhibited none. The value of the 35-day test point in Figure 5 , which was not significantly above baseline, reflects the averaging of these all-or-none data.
A similar dissociation was also found when 14-and 18-month-olds were subsequently tested for their retention of six different activities that they had originally performed during a single session in a laboratory playroom. Their magnitude of cued-recall progressively declined as the retention interval between the original enactment and testing increased (Hudson, 1994) , but their magnitude of retention following a reactivation treatment was the same whether the delay between training and reminding was 8 weeks or 10 weeks (Sheffield & Hudson, 1994) . It is noteworthy that the retention interval after which toddlers remembered the original play activities in the cuedrecall test was virtually identical to the duration of delayed (A retention ratio of 1.00 indicates no forgetting from the immediate to the long-term test.) Asterisks mark groups that displayed no retention (baseline ratio not > 1.00). Data are from Hayne, 1990; Rovee-Collier, Sullivan, Enright, Lucas, & Fagen, 1980 .
recognition that we obtained for same-age infants in the train task (see Figure 4) , despite the fact that only in the latter task was the target response originally learned through operant conditioning.
Vulnerability
Although there is a rich tradition of research documenting that adults' performance on explicit memory tasks is vulnerable to interference (Barnes & Underwood, 1959; Postman & Underwood, 1973 ) , evidence that performance on implicit memory tasks is relatively insensitive to interference is more recent (Graf & Schacter, 1987; Sloman, Hayman, Ohta, Law, & Tulving, 1988; Tulving, 1983) . Priming on word-fragment (Sloman et al., 1988) , word-completion (Graf & Schacter, 1987) , and lexical decision (Bentin & Moscovitch, 1988) tasks, for example, is unaffected by the same interference manipulations that produce memory impairment on recognition, cued-recall, and free-recall tests.
A similar dissociation has been observed infants' memory performance on delayed-recognition and reactivation tasks. When 3-month-olds were trained with one mobile in Session 1 and with a different mobile in Session 2, they failed to recognize the Session 1 mobile in a delayed-recognition test 24 hr later--a classic example of retroactive interference (Fagen, Morrongiello, Rovee-Collier, & Gekoski, 1984) . This retroactive interference effect occurred even when infants were trained with a particular mobile for a total of 30 min over 2 successive days and then, immediately after training was over, they merely viewed--for only 3 min--a novel mobile that was being moved by the experimenter. These infants, like those in the Fagen et al. (1984) study, also failed to recognize the original mobile during a delayed-recognition test 24 hr later (Rovee-Collier, Borza, Adler, & Boiler, 1993) . At 6 months of age, infants were trained with one mobile for two sessions and then were passively shown the novel mobile for only 2 min after delays ranging from 1 to 13 days following the second training session. Even after the longest exposure delay, infants were still unable to recognize the original mobile on the ensuing delayed-recognition test. In contrast, infants with no interpolated exposure exhibited nearperfect retention on the long-term test after the same retention interval (Muzzio & Rovee-Collier, 1996) .
The retroactive interference exhibited by infants in the delayed-recognition task is not limited to instances in which they are exposed to a different mobile between training and testing. A similar result was obtained when infants were trained with the same mobile in a different context in each of two sessions and were then tested for recognition of the mobile in the original (Session 1 ) context. At both 3 months (Rovee-Collier & DuFault, 1991 ) and 6 months (Amabile & Rovee-Collier, 1991 ) , training in a second context impaired infants' ability to recognize the original mobile in the original training context during a delayed-recognition test 24 hr after Session 2. Retroactive interference also occurred when 3-month-olds (A. RossiGeorge, unpublished observations, April 8, 1996) and 6-montholds (Boiler & Rovee-Collier, 1992) were trained in the same context for 2 days and then were simply exposed to a novel context immediately after training was over. Infants again could no longer recognize the training mobile in the original context during the 24-hr test (see Figure 6 , left panel); instead, they now recognized the original mobile only in the briefly exposed context.
In contrast to the susceptibility of infants' delayed recognition to retroactive interference, a reactivated memory is relatively impervious to retroactive interference by new information that is interpolated between the reactivation treatment and testing. Using the same exposure condition that impaired 6-month-olds' recognition of the original mobile in the original context ( Figure  6 , left panel), we were unable to impair their reactivated memory by exposing them to a new context after a reactivation treatment (Boiler & Rovee-Collier, 1994) . Whether infants were exposed to the novel context immediately after a reactivation treatment or after delays that ranged from 15 rain to 24 hr, they continued to recognize the mobile only in the original context (see Figure 6 , right panel) and never recognized it in the exposed one.
Number of Study Trials
In studies with adults, recognition improves as the number of study trials or stimulus presentations increases, but the number of study trials has little or no effect on priming. Musen and Treisman (1990) , for example, gave adults visual patterns to study for 3 s each; after each pattern was removed, they were allowed to rehearse it for 7 s before the next pattern was presented. After this initial study period, some participants were again exposed to the sequence of patterns four times (each pattern was reexposed for only 1 s), whereas others received only the initial study trial. Explicit memory was measured in a fixed-choice recognition test in which participants indicated which one of the four test stimuli they had previously studied. training and magnitude of reactivation (right panel) 3 weeks after training at 6 months of age. Groups either were exposed to a novel context between training or reminding and testing (Interference) or were not (None) and were tested in the original training context. (A retention ratio of 1.00 indicates no forgetting from the immediate to the longterm retention test.) Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Amabile & Rovee-Collier, 1991; Boiler & Rovee-Collier, 1994 .
Implicit memory was measured in a perception test in which studied patterns and distractor patterns were presented singly, followed by a mask, and participants were instructed to draw what they had just seen; the priming effect was determined by comparing performance on the old and the new patterns. Individuals in both the repeated-and the single-trial conditions were tested immediately after the first session and 8 days later. In addition, some individuals in the repeated-trials condition were tested in a second session 1 to 3 hours after their first. Musen and Treisman found that the number of study trials had a negligible effect on priming whether testing occurred later on the same day or after an 8-day delay. In contrast, the decline in recognition accuracy was almost three times greater in the single-trial group than in the repeated-trials group after the 8-day delay. Studies using more conventional verbal materials with adults similarly found that increasing the number of massed repetitions beyond a single presentation had little or no effect on priming in implicit tests (e.g., word-fragment completion) but significantly improved performance on recall and recognition tests (Challis & Sidhu, 1993) . In a study of deferred imitation with 14-montholds, Bauer et al. (1995) similarly found that performance on an explicit memory test was dramatically improved by additional trials. Infants received either one or three trials, and their ability to reproduce ordered events was assessed either 1 week or (for the three-trial group only) 1 month later. After a single trial, toddlers exhibited excellent cued recall after 1 week but poor cued recall after 1 month; after three trials, toddlers performed as well after 1 month as those with only one trial had performed after l week.
In mobile studies, the number of training trials also has a differential effect on memory performance on delayed-recognition and reactivation tests. At 3 months, each additional training trial (session) prolonged delayed recognition by 1 week (see Figure 7 , left panel; Ohr, Fagen, Rovee-Collier, Hayne, & Vander Linde, 1989) but did not affect the magnitude of reactivation 3 weeks after training was over (see Figure 7 , right panel; Greco, Hayne, & Rovee-Collier, 1990; . The same effect was found at 6 months of age; increasing the number of training sessions from one to two prolonged delayed recognition from 1 week (K. Boller, unpublished observations, June 2, 1996) to 2 weeks (Hill et al., 1988) , but the magnitude of reactivation 3 weeks later was unaffected by whether infants were trained for two sessions , three sessions , or four sessions (Timmons, 1994) . The magnitude of reactivation was also not affected by the number of reactivation treatments. Hayne (1990) , for example, found that the magnitude of reactivation 3 weeks after training was identical whether 3-montholds received one, two, or three reminders.
The retention advantage of a greater number of trials was observed even when the total amount of training time was held constant over trials. Vander Linde et al. ( 1985 ) trained 2-montholds in the mobile task for either one 18-min trial or three 6-min trials that were separated by 24 hr. During a delayedrecognition test 3 weeks later, infants whose training time was distributed across three trials exhibited near-perfect retention, whereas infants whose training time occurred within a single session exhibited none after the same delay.
Spacing Effects
In studies with adults, superior performance on tests of recall and recognition is a common result when study trials are distributed instead of massed (for reviews, see R. L. Cohen, 1985;  Figure 7. The effect of number of training sessions at 3 months on the magnitude of delayed recognition (left panel) after different delays and the magnitude of reactivation (right panel) 3 weeks after training. Asterisks mark groups that exhibited retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Greco, Hayne, & Rovee-Collier, 1990; Ohr, Fagen, RoveeCollier, Hayne, & Vander Linde, 1989; Rovee-Collier, Sullivan, Enright, Lucas, & Fagen, 1980 . Crowder, 1976 . In contrast, spacing effects on priming tests are inconsistent and small (e.g., Challis & Sidhu, 1993; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Perruchet, 1989) . Although Greene (1990) found a spacing effect on a perceptual identification test under intentional learning instructions, the effect disappeared when leaming was incidental or when the spacing was manipulated between study lists. Jacoby ( 1978; Cuddy & Jacoby, 1982) attributed the retention advantage of spaced study on explicit tests to the greater processing that is required for successful retrieval when successive repetitions are further apart. Assuming that each trial or presentation of an item initiated retrieval of the memory of its prior presentation, he proposed that when trials were massed, retrieval was trivial and required little processing; when the interval between successive trials was greater, retrieval was more difficult, and more processing was involved.
Bjork and his colleagues (M. C. Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Bjork, 1975; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992) similarly attributed the retention advantage of spaced study trials to the greater retrieval difficulty associated with the greater amount of time since the last retrieval. In a classic study (Landauer & Bjork, 1978) , adults learned a number of names or name-picture associations during a single study session in which each item was presented once. They then received three or four cued-recall tests, and the intervals between succeeding tests were filled with different numbers of names. Retention was poorest when test items were massed (no intervening names), better when four or five items intervened between successive tests, and best when the number of items between successive tests increased progressively. They concluded that the expanding series of interitem intervals permitted adults to practice retrieval under increasingly difficult conditions. Rea and Modigliani ( 1985 ) similarly found that children's recall of multiplication facts and spelling lists was significantly enhanced by an expanding series of practice tests.
In mobile studies, at both 2 months (Vander Linde et al., 1985) and 3 months (Rovee-Collier, Evancio, & Earley, 1995) , the magnitude of delayed recognition 8 days after Session 1 was significantly greater when the interval between two successive sessions was 2 days than when it was 1 day. At 3 months, when the intersession interval was 4 days, however, infants exhibited no recognition at all on the 8-day test. This result was interpreted in terms of the time window construct (Rovee-Collier, 1995) , which holds that there is a limited period of time following an initial event (Session 1 ) within which subsequent information (Session 2) can be integrated with the memory representation of the initial event. Information that is encountered after the time window has shut is not integrated with the initial event but is treated as unique, that is, as if it had been encountered for the first time. In the study with 3-month-olds, the time window for integrating two successive training sessions apparently shut after 3 days (see Figure 8 , left panel). The magnitude of reactivation 15 days after Session 1, however, was the same whether the two training sessions were spaced by 1 day or 2 days. When the two sessions were spaced by 4 days (i.e., Session 2 was outside of the time window), however, the reactivation treatment was not effective (see Figure 8 , right panel). Muller and Rovee-Collier (1996) trained 3-month-olds for three sessions but programmed them such that successive intersession intervals (ISis) were in an expanding series (Days 0 - 2 -8 ) or in a constant series (Days 0 -4 -8 ) . Although the mean ISI was the same (4 days) for both groups, the second training session was again either inside (Day 2) or outside (Day 4) the time window for the integration of two training sessions. As in studies with adults and children, training infants with an expanding series of ISis prolonged retention on the explicit test. Although 3-month-olds who were trained on 3 successive days (Days 0 -1 -2 ) exhibited significant recognition 2 weeks after their final session but not 3 weeks afterward , infants who were trained for three sessions in an expanding series exhibited significant recognition 3 weeks after their final session (i.e., 29 days after Session 1 ) but not 4 weeks afterward.
In contrast, the constant-series training group failed to recognize the training mobile 1 week after its final session, even though this group had received three training sessions. In another study , 3-month-olds were trained for three sessions and then were shown a novel moving object either immediately after training was over (when the time window opened) or 4 days later (at the end of the time window, which closes after 4 days with three training sessions). Infants who were exposed to the object at the beginning of the time window recognized it for only 4 days, but infants who were exposed to the object at the end of the time window recognized it for 10 additional days. Although the delay between training and exposure to the novel object affected infants' magnitude of delayed recognition after a retention interval of 1 day, it had no effect on their magnitude of reactivation after a retention interval of 3 weeks (see Figure   9 ; Greco et al., 1990; Rovee-Collier, Greco-Vigorito, et al., 1993) .
Stimulus Exposure (Study) Time
The total time hypothesis is a widely accepted principle in human memory. It states that the degree to which an item is recalled is a direct function of its total study time, irrespective of the manner in which that time is distributed (R. L. Cohen, 1985; Cooper & Pantie, 1967; for review, see Crowder, 1976) . The amount of perceptual processing that can be completed at the time of encoding is also constrained by the length of time a stimulus is physically available to the perceiver; as its exposure time increases, the perceiver should be able to extract more perceptual information from the stimulus. In studies with adults, neither study time nor stimulus exposure time affects measures of implicit memory, but both affect measures of explicit memory. For example, Von Hippel and Hawkins (1994, Experiment 1 ) measured retention in three implicit tasks (word-fragment completion, perceptual identification, and general knowledge) and found that increasing stimulus exposure time had no effect on implicit conceptual memory performance when the encoding task focused on the perceptual features of the stimulus. Other researchers have also reported that increasing stimulus exposure time has no effect on performance in either a perceptual identification task (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981 ) or a word-fragment completion task (Neill, Beck, Bottalico, & Molloy, 1990 ) but improves performance in explicit memory tasks (Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Neill et al., 1990) , including the free recall of word lists (Roberts, 1972a) . Figure 9 . The effect of the timing of a brief posttraining exposure to a novel object on the magnitude of delayed recognition of that object (left panel) 1 day after the exposure and on the magnitude of reactivation (right panel) 3 weeks after training at 3 months of age. (A retention ratio of 1.00 indicates no forgetting.) Asterisks indicate that all groups displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Greco, Hayne, & Rovee-Collier, 1990; Using nonverbal stimulus materials, Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, and Tharan ( 1991 ) exposed adults to either single or multiple presentations of visual objects and measured their memory performance in an object decision task (a test of implicit memory). When the exposure duration was 5 s, a single exposure was as effective as multiple exposures in facilitating priming. When the exposure duration was reduced to 1 s, however, multiple exposures led to significant priming, but a single exposure did not. When Musen (1991) increased the duration of a single exposure of a novel visual figure from 1 s to 10 s, however, she found that performance on a priming task was not affected, but recognition performance was significantly enhanced.
In a deferred-imitation study with preverbal infants, Barr et al. (1996) exposed 6-month-olds to a demonstrator modeling a sequence of three actions on a hand puppet for 30 s. They found no evidence of deferred imitation after a 24-hr delay, but infants' deferred imitation immediately after training was excellent. When they increased the stimulus exposure period from 30 to 60 s, however, infants' 24-hr deferred imitation was also excellent.
In mobile studies with infants, increasing the study time similarly enhances performance on a delayed-recognition test. Twomonth-olds who were trained for 12 min in a single session, for example, failed to recognize the mobile after 1 week, but their recognition was excellent after that delay when they were trained for 18 min (Rovee-Collier, 1984; Vander Linde et al., 1985) . At 3 months, infants trained for a single session lasting 6 or 9 rain failed to recognize the original mobile 1 week later, but with a 12-rain session, they recognized it for 1 week, and with an 18-min session, they recognized it for 2 weeks (see Figure 10 ; Ohr et al., 1989) . Figure 10 . The effect of study time (session duration) on the magnitude of delayed recognition of independent groups of 3-month-olds tested 7, 14, or 21 days later. Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Ohr, Fagen, Rovee-CoUier, Hayne, & Vander Linde, 1989. In another manipulation of stimulus exposure time, 3-montholds were trained with a particular mobile for two sessions and then were merely exposed to a novel mobile for either 120 s or 10 s immediately after training was over. On a delayed-recognition test 24 hr later, the 120-s exposure interfered with infants' ability to recognize the original mobile and led them to treat the briefly exposed mobile as if they had been trained with it instead (Rovee-Collier, Borza, et al., 1993) ; the 10-s exposure produced the same interference effect after 1 hr but not after 24 hr (Bhatt, 1997) . No reactivation (priming) data pertaining to exposure duration are available.
Number of Studied Items
G. Mandler (1985) characterized nonautomatic memories as capacity demanding and distinguished them from automatic memories with no capacity demand. Although he rejected the explicit-implicit memory distinction, similar differences in capacity demand have been found to affect performance in explicit and implicit memory tasks, respectively. In studies with adults, increasing the number of studied items decreases performance on explicit memory tasks but does not affect performance on implicit memory tasks. Adding new items to a study list impairs adults' retention in free-recall, cued-recall, and recognition tasks (Atkinson & Joula, 1973; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976; see Crowder, 1976~ for review). Reinitz and Demb (1994) , for example, had college students study a list of compound words and then tested them on either an old-new recognition test or a perceptual identification test with old words, recombined words, compound words in which either the first or second parts were new, and completely new words. On the recognition test, the number of false recognitions increased with the number of studied components. On the perceptual identification task, however, priming occurred only for old words; identification of the other test items was poor, irrespective of the number of previously studied components. Mitchell and Brown (1988) similarly found that the magnitude of repetition priming was not affected by the number of studied items, or list size.
In a mobile study with 2-and 3-month-old infants, the number of studied items was defined in terms of the number of different types of blocks on the training mobile; all five mobile blocks were identical, or each was different (Rovee-Collier, Earley, & Stafford, 1989) . At both ages, performance on a 24-hr delayedrecognition test was better when the list was shorter (i,e., when the five objects were identical; see Figure 11 , left panel), but the magnitude of reactivation 3 weeks after training was unaffected by the number of studied items at 3 months of age (see Figure 11 , right panel). Reactivation data for 2-month-olds are not available.
Likewise, Merriman, Rovee-Collier, and Wilk (in press) trained 6-month-olds with an ordered "list" of three mobiles for three successive sessions. T~venty-four hours after their final training session, infants recognized the test mobile from Serial Position 1, but they did not recognize the mobiles from Serial Positions 2 and 3 --a classic primacy effect. They also discriminated a novel mobile as not on the study list. Because independent groups were tested with only a single mobile from a given serial position (a serial-probe recognition procedure), we hypothesized that infants might have learned both item and order reactivation task, 24 hr after priming (Bhatt & Rovee-Collier, in press ). Figure 11 . The effect of the number of different objects (studied items) on the training mobile on the magnitude of delayed recognition 1 day after training (left panel) and the magnitude of reactivation (right panel ) 3 weeks after training at 2 and 3 months of age. (A retention ratio of 1.00 indicates no forgetting.) Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Davis & Rovee-Collier, 1983; Greco, Hayne, & Rovee-Collier, 1990; Hayne, 1990; Rovee-Collier, Earley, & Stafford, 1989; Rovee-Collier, Hankins, & Bhatt, 1992. information during training but failed to recognize the test mobiles from Serial Positions 2 and 3 because the single test stimulus provided no order information. In a follow-up study , when the number of mobiles on the list was increased from three to five, the primacy effect disappeared. Instead, infants now recognized mobiles from all serial positions on the study list during a delayed-recognition test 24-hr later (see Figure 12 ) and again discriminated a novel mobile as not on the study list. Presumably, infants failed to learn order information when the list was longer, and therefore it no longer interfered with their recognition of the items from the middle and last serial positions. This result again demonstrates that infants' memory performance on a delayed-recognition test is affected by the number of items on the study list.
Finally, infants' delayed recognition was also impaired when the number of studied features and feature relations on the training mobiles was increased. Three-month-olds were trained with a six-block mobile displaying either two feature sets with three feature combinations each (three blocks per set) or three feature sets with three feature combinations each (two blocks per set). In the two-set condition, three training blocks displayed red As on a black ground and three blocks displayed green 2s on a yellow ground; in the three-set condition, two training blocks each displayed the preceding combinations as well as brown Xs on a blue ground. During the 24-hr delayed-recognition test, two features from the original combinations ( figure, figure color , or ground color) were exchanged between the sets (e.g., a figure-color recombination would yield green As on a black ground and red 2s on a yellow ground). Infants discriminated recombinations of all features when trained with two feature sets but not with three feature sets (Bhatt & Rovee-Collier, 1994, in press ). Thus, they remembered "what went with what" 24 hours later only when the number of features and feature relations was smaller. Even though infants had failed to discriminate feature recombinations from the three-feature set in the 24-hour delayed-recognition task, they did discriminate all feature recombinations from the three-feature set 3 weeks later in the
Level o f Processing
Level of processing (LOP) is an encoding variable that is widely thought to affect performance differently on implicit and explicit memory tasks. In their original exposition, Craik and Lockhart (1972) suggested that the duration of a memory was determined by the level or depth at which the perceptual input for that memory was processed. Thus, the shallower processing of phonemic and orthographic features (e.g., searching for specific letters in a word) should lead to a shorter duration of retention, whereas the deeper processing required by the generation of a verbal associate or a semantic-orienting task (e.g., rating the pleasantness of words on a study list) should lead to a longer duration of retention. Over time, other accounts of observed retention differences as a function of encoding difficulty were advanced. Craik and Tulving (1975) , for example, attributed retention differences to the degree of stimulus elaboration instead of to differences in processing depth during encoding, retaining the term depth to refer to the degree of semantic involvement. Others introduced terms such as meaningfulness, differentiation, integration, distinctiveness, and so forth (for review, see Tulving, 1983 ) in attempts to explain encoding difficulty in terms of a single factor.
In memory studies with adults, manipulations of LOP produce strong effects on explicit tests but no effects on implicit tests (Graf, Mandler, & Haden, 1982 Figure 12 . The 24-hr delayed-recognition performance of independent groups of 6-month-olds tested with mobiles from the first, middle, and last serial positions of a three-mobile list (left panel) and a five-mobile list (right panel). Infants trained with both lists failed to recognize (i.e., they discriminated) a novel test mobile. Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Merriman, Rovee-Collier, & Will in press. 1984; Moscovitch, 1994; Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler, 1992) . One of the earliest demonstrations of this dissociation was reported by Jacoby and Dallas ( 1981 ) . They asked college students to answer three yes-no questions about each word on a long list and then assessed their retention on either a perceptual identification task or a recognition task. The shallow-encoding condition included questions about the letters in the word and a rhyme question; the deep-encoding condition questions concerned the meaning of the word. Initially, each question appeared briefly on a screen and then was replaced by the target word, which remained on the screen until the question was answered. During the recognition test, students responded "yes" to words that had been presented in the first phase and "no" to those that were new. During the perceptual identification test, words were simply flashed on the screen, and students reported each word immediately. Jacoby and Dallas found that the semantic question had longer reaction times than the other two questions, and "no" responses took longer than "yes" responses. On the recognition memory test, the probability of a correct word identification was significantly higher for semantic questions and questions requiring a "yes" response; on the perceptual identification test, however, neither the type of question nor whether it required a "yes" or "no" answer affected the probability of correctly identifying a word. Although they found no effect of LOP, presentation of a word in the first phase did produce a significant priming effect in the second phase: Perceptual identification was significantly enhanced when test items were old. Moreover, the amount of priming was the same whether recognition memory was poor or near perfect. An example of the dissociation produced by LOP manipulations in a developmental study was reported by Carroll et al. (1985) . They presented a list composed of pictures to 5-, 7-, and 10-year-olds and a group of adults, instructing participants either to search for pictures marked with a cross (the shallowencoding condition) or to judge the weight of the objects that were pictured (the deep-encoding condition). At each age, performance was measured on both a recognition test and a naming test. As expected, recognition improved with age. In addition, priming was unaffected by either age or encoding condition, but picture recognition was better in the deep than in the shallowencoding condition. In three experiments with elementary school children and young adults, Naito (1990) similarly found no effect of either age or LOP on priming in a word-completion task, but recall increased with age and a deeper LOP.
In three experiments, we have obtained robust effects of LOP on infants' performance in a delayed-recognition task (Adler, Gerhardstein, & Rovee-Collier, in press ). In all experiments, attention during encoding was manipulated by training 3-montholds with a pop-out display composed of a unique target (e.g., L) amidst six distractors (e.g., +s). (A pop-out display is thought to enhance attention to the target at the expense of attention to the distractors.) In Experiment 1, infants tested after a 24-hr delay with a homogeneous mobile composed entirely of targets or distractors recognized both the original target and the original distractors, confirming that both had been encoded during training. In Experiment 2, infants who were trained with the same pop-out mobile recognized Ls (the original target) after delays more than twice as long as controls who were trained with a mobile composed entirely of Ls; conversely, they recognized Ls (the original distractors) after a delay less than half as long as controls who were trained with a mobile composed entirely of Ls (see Figure 13) . Finally, Experiment 3 replicated the retention advantage gained by enhancing infants' attention during training with a pop-out mobile with +s. These results were consistent with adult findings that increasing attention to an item during encoding increases its depth of processing and protracts its retention on an explicit memory task. Reactivation data for the implicit task are not available.
Affect
Most of the research on the role of affect in retention has focused either on the congruence of the mood during encoding and retrieval or on the congruence between the nature of the mood at the time of retrieval and the nature of what is retrieved (e.g., G. H. Bower, 1981; Eich, Macaulay, & Ryan, 1994 ; for review, see Blaney, 1986) . Recently, researchers have begun to explore the contribution of affect to memory performance on implicit and explicit tests (Denny & Hunt, 1992; Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Macaulay, Ryan, & Eich, 1993; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992) . Research with both adults with normal moods and adults with affective disorders has demonstrated that performance on explicit tests is sensitive to affect, but performance on implicit tests is not (Tulving, 1983) . Hertel and Hardin (1990) queried college students who were not depressed (scores < 6 on the Beck Depression Inventory [BDI] ; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erlbaugh, 1961 ) and who were naturally depressed (BDI scores > 6 and <9) about the uncommon meanings of homophones, gave them depressiveor neutral-mood inductions, and then tested both their spelling (an implicit task) and their recognition of old and new homophones. Neither induced nor naturally occurring depression affected spelling, but both impaired recognition of the old homophones. Watkins et al. (1992) assessed memory for affectively valenced words with adults who were clinically diagnosed with major depression or dysthymia (BDI scores > 19; mean BDI score = 27.53) or were not depressed (BDI scores > 8, mean BDI score = 3.71 ). Relative to who were not depressed, performance of adults who were depressed on a cued-recall test was impaired, but the two groups performed equivalently on a wordcompletion test. Similarly, Denny and Hunt (1992) found that the free recall of affectively valenced words was impaired in a patient population of individuals who were clinically depressed relative to adults who were not depressed, but the two groups performed equivalently on a word-fragment completion test.
In mobile studies with 3-month-olds, Fagen and his colleagues have repeatedly found that infants' delayed recognition is highly sensitive to affect, but their memory performance in a reactivation task is not (for review, see Fagen & Prigot, 1993) . In these studies, infants were typically trained for two sessions with a 10-object mobile and then were shifted to a nonpreferred 2-object mobile during a final session. In response to the shift, approximately 50% of the infants usually cried. During delayedrecognition tests either 1 day or 1 week later, infants who did not cry exhibited excellent retention irrespective of whether they were tested with the 10-object or 2-object mobile, whereas infants who cried recognized the test mobiles after a 1-day reten- Test L Figure 13 . The level-of-processing effect at 3 months of age, shown as the protracted recognition over days of +s (left panel) and Ls (right panel) when they were the target (white columns) on the pop-out training mobile. Also shown is the maximum duration of retention of control groups (striped columns) who were trained with a homogeneous + or L mobile, respectively, and the diminished recognition over days of +s and Ls when they were the distractors (dark columns) on the L or + pop-out training mobile, respectively. The corresponding control group for the distractors was trained with a homogeneous mobile displaying the same character as the distractor. (A retention ratio of 1.00 indicates no forgetting.) Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Adler, Gerhardstein, & Rovee-Collier, in press; .
tion interval but not after a 1-week delay (Fagen, Ohr, Singer, & Klein, 1989 ; see Figure 14 , left panel). Despite the impaired performance of infants who cried on the 1-week delayed-recognition test, when a reactivation treatment was administered 3 Figure 14 . The effect of crying on the magnitude of delayed recognition 1 day or 7 days after training (left panel) and the magnitude of reactivation (right panel) 3 weeks after training at 3 months of age. Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Fagen, Ohr, Fleckenstein, & Ribner, 1985; Fagen, Ohr, Singer, & Klein, 1989. weeks after the conclusion of training, all infants exhibited the same magnitude of reactivation 1 day later whether they had cried after a mobile shift or not (see Figure 14 , right panel; Fagen, Ohr, Fleckenstein, & Ribner, 1985) . Singer and Fagen (1992) repeated this procedure but used a measure of infants' facial expressions of affect (AFFEX; Izard, Dougherty, & Hembree, 1980) in addition to crying. Following the shift to the 2-object mobile, infants who cried exhibited decreasing amounts of interest expressions and increasing amounts of anger and sadness expressions. During the 1-day recognition test, infants who cried again displayed significantly more anger expressions than infants who did not cry, but during the 7-day recognition test, they displayed none. In addition to providing a convergent measure of affect, these data confirmed that the poor performance of infants who cried during the 1-week test was not simply a result of their refusal to participate in the task but an instance of true forgetting (Fagen & Prigot, 1993) .
Finally, the interval between training with the preferred mobile and training with the nonpreferred mobile is an important determinant of the degree of impairment in delayed recognition. When a delay of 0, 2, 5, or 15 min was interpolated between infants' exposure to the pre-and postshift mobiles, infants who cried again failed to recognize the test mobile 1 week later; when the interpolated delay was increased to 30 min, however, their performance on the delayed-recognition test was excellent. The performance of infants who did not cry on the l-week test, by comparison, was excellent after all postshift delays .
Serial Position
The serial position of items on a study list has long been known to produce strong and persistent primacy effects, recency effects, or both on immediate tests of free recall, cued-recall, and recognition memory (e.g., Bousfield, Whitmarsh, & Esterson, 1958; Gershberg & Shimamura, 1994; Murdock, 1962; Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick, & Cook, 1985) . A handful of researchers have found recency effects on implicit tests of both word-stem completion (McKenzie & Humphries, 1991; Rybash & Osborne, 1991 ) and word-fragment completion (Sloman et al., 1988) , but Brooks (1994) observed that the instructions and procedures in these reports were either suspect or reported in insufficient detail.
Two laboratories have recently used the same study instructions and test stimuli but different instructions for the implicit and explicit tests. Gershberg and Shimamura (1994) obtained inconsistent evidence for primacy and recency effects across three experiments. Implicit word-stem completion tests, for example, yielded a primacy effect in two experiments and a recency effect in one, and these effects were highly transient when they did occur. Different explicit tests (word-stern-cued-recall, free-recall) also yielded inconsistent primacy, recency, or both effects across experiments. Using word-stem completion and word-stem-cued-recall tests with adults with normal memory, Brooks (1994) found primacy effects on an explicit test in two experiments and, when the items studied last were tested first, a recency effect in the second of these. In neither experiment, however, did serial position affect performance on the implicit test. Taken together, the data indicated that the serial order of the items on the study list had no effect on performance in implicit tests but produced a primacy effect in explicit tests. Finally, in two experiments, patients with both Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff amnesia performed more poorly than controls on tests requiring the recall, recognition, and sequencing of words and facts (Shimamura, Janowsky, & Squire, 1991 ) .
A delayed-recognition test with 6-month-olds also revealed a strong primacy effect after a 24-hr delay (Merriman et al., in press ). In a study described earlier (cf. Number of Studied Items), independent groups of infants were trained with a serial list of three different mobiles for 2 min each on 3 successive days and were tested 24 h later with a mobile from one of the three serial positions or with a completely novel mobile. On the delayed-recognition test, infants had recognized only the mobile from Serial Position 1 (see Figure 12 , left panel). A follow-up study, also described earlier, demonstrated that infants' poor recognition of the last two list items had not resulted from an initial encoding failure; infants were capable of recognizing items from as many as five serial positions 24 h later ; see Figure 12 , right panel). We conjectured, therefore, that infants who were trained with the threemobile list may have failed to recognize the mobiles from Serial Positions 2 and 3 because the single retrieval cue in the 24-hr serial-probe recognition test had provided no order information.
This conjecture was confirmed when infants were trained on a three-mobile list and then were primed for 2 rain by the mobile from the preceding serial position (i.e., a sequential-probe procedure) immediately prior to the 24-hr test. (This procedure closely resembles a stem-completion priming task in studies with adults.) Infants recognized the test mobile from Serial Position 2 if they were first primed by the mobile from Serial Position 1 but not if they were primed by the mobile from Serial Position 3. Infants also failed to recognize the test mobile from Serial Position 3 after priming by the mobile from Serial Position 1, as did 4 of the 6 infants who were primed with the mobile from Serial Position 2. When infants were successively primed for 1 min each with the mobiles from Serial Position 1 and Serial Position 2, however, they recognized the test mobile from Serial Position 3. Unlike the magnitude of retention on the delayed recognition test, the magnitude of retention after the priming treatment was not sensitive to serial position. Following primes that were valid order cues, the primacy effect disappeared, and mobiles from Serial Positions 2 and 3 were recognized equally well and as well as the mobile from Serial Position 1 (see Figure 15) .
Finally, Mandel, Kemler Nelson, and Jusczyk (1996) , using the high-amplitude sucking procedure, reported that infants as young as 2 months could discriminate a change in the order of spoken words on a 2-min delayed-recognition test if the change was embedded in a well-formed sentence but not in a sentence fragment. The authors concluded that the sentential prosody helped infants remember the sequentially ordered words.
Studied Size
In studies with adults with normal memory and patients with amnesia, a change in the studied size of an object at the time of testing impairs performance on recognition memory tasks 0 o~ rll- Biederman & Cooper, 1992; Jolicoeur, 1987; Milliken & Jolicoeur, 1992; Schacter, Cooper, & Treadwell, 1993) and object decision tasks (Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1992; Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, et al., 1991 ) , but these same studyto-test size changes do not affect priming on either object naming tasks (Biederman & Cooper, 1991 or object decision tasks (Schacter, Cooper, Tharan, & Rubens, 1991; , whether the objects are novel or familiar. The same pattern of impaired recognition and preserved priming has been obtained with 3-month-olds in delayed-recognition and reactivation tests, respectively, following transformations in studied size. In an initial study, infants who were trained with a mobile composed of seven pink blocks with a black L on each side exhibited excellent retention in a 24-hr delayed-recognition test with the same characters (the no-change control group); when tested with Ls that were either reduced or increased in size by 25%, however, infants' performance on the delayedrecognition test was significantly impaired (Adler & RoveeCollier, 1994) . In a subsequent study with a different stimulus (Gerhardstein, Adler, & Rovee-Collier, 1996) , the delayed recognition of 3-month-olds who were trained with a mobile displaying + s was significantly impaired when they were tested 24 hr after training with + s that were either reduced or increased in size by 33% (see Figure 16 , left panel). In contrast, the magnitude of reactivation 2 weeks later was excellent and unaffected by transformations in the size of the + s used as reminders to prime the memory (see Figure 16 , right panel).
Memory Load
The term memory load has been used with reference to the length of the retention interval, with longer test delays creating a greater memory load (Quinn & Eimas, 1996) , and to the Figure 16 . The effect of changing the size of the training character by 33% on the magnitude of delayed recognition 24 hr after training (left panel) and the magnitude of reactivation (right panel) 3 weeks after training at 3 months of age. The performance of no-change control groups who were trained and either tested or primed with the original character is also shown. Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > 1.00). Data are from Gerhardstein, Adler, & RoveeCollier, 1996; Rovee-Collier, Hankins, & Bhatt, 1992. amount of information that must be retained over a given delay (G. Mandler, 1985) . Both of these usages were considered earlier (see Retention Interval and Number of Studied Items). A third factor that affects the memory load is the nature of the to-be-remembered information. For infants as for adults, for example, relational information creates a greater memory load than absolute information. Adler and Rovee-Collier (1994) reported that 3-month-old infants could discriminate horizontal and vertical line segments (two textons) in different spatial relations (L versus T) during a l-hr delayed-recognition test but not during a 24-hr test. However, they could discriminate + s, which contain a line crossing (a third texton), from both Ls and ~ during a 7-day test. In addition, infants recognized Ls and Ts for only 3 days, but they recognized + s for 7 days. These data illustrate the greater retention advantage for absolute information (texton number) relative to relational information (spatial arrangement). Despite differences in the memorability of these stimuli on delayed-recognition tests, their magnitude of reactivation was equivalent when the same stimuli were used as reminders with 3-month-olds 2 weeks after training (RoveeCollier, Hankins, et al., 1992) and with 6-month-olds 3 weeks after training (Bhatt, Rovee-Collier, & Weiner, 1994) .
In the following studies, increasing the memory load selectively impaired infants' retention of relational information on a delayed-recognition task but not on a reactivation task. In a sequel to the feature-combinations study described earlier ; see Number of Studied Items), 3-month-olds differentially forgot the correlations between different training features (relational information) as the retention interval increased from 1 day to 3 days, but they still recognized the individual features (absolute information) and discriminated them from novel features on a delayed-recognition test after a 4-day retention interval . When the number of feature sets on the training mobile was increased from two to three, infants recognized the feature relations on the two-set mobile but not on the three-set mobile during a 24-hr delayed-recognition test. In a reactivation task, however, the three-set mobile was an effective reminder 2 weeks later if it displayed the original feature combinations but not if it displayed feature recombinations (Bhatt & Rovee-Collier, in press ). Finally, recall that 6-month-olds who were trained with a three-mobile list had recognized only the mobile from Serial Position 1 and had discriminated a novel one (absolute information) during a 24-hr serial-probe-recognition test (see Figure  14 , left panel). In the reactivation task, however, infants had also recognized items from Serial Positions 2 and 3 after the same delay (see Figure 14 , right panel), but only if the prime and test cue were in the correct serial order (both absolute and relational information; .
Context
The role of context in retention has been of interest to psychologists for almost a century. Broadly speaking, the context refers to global aspects of the experimental environment, including both external conditions (e.g., the room, the experimenter, and the apparatus) and internal conditions (e.g., the inner state of the individual, including the pharmacological state, the mood or affective state, and processes associated with the point in the circadian or uitradian cycle). However, the context can also refer to more local stimuli, such as the visual stimuli that surround or precede a target object or the items that accompany the target item on each study trial. In such cases, the context usually facilitates the interpretation of the target (for review, see Clark & Carlson, 1981 ) . Tulving (1983) claimed that the effect of context on episodic memory is more pronounced than on semantic memory, and G. Mandler ( 1985 ) , although rejecting a multiple memory-systems approach, considered nonautomatic memories to be context dependent and automatic memories to be context free. Neely (1989; Neely & Durgunoglu, 1985) , however, concluded that the evidence for these distinctions was ambiguous, and Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork (1988) observed small but persistent context effects over a wide range of perceptual identification (priming) studies, even though effects within a given study were often not significant. In fact, although abundant research shows that a change in context between study and test impairs performance on recognition and recall tests (R. L. Cohen, 1985; Spear, 1978; Thomson & Tulving, 1970; Underwood & Humphreys, 1979) , less research has addressed the role of context in performance on implicit memory tests.
In an early study of this sort, Jacoby (1983) had adults read a list of words and then gave them a perceptual identification test containing different proportions of words from the previously read list. Perceptual identification was facilitated by the proportional overlap between the study and the test list. Likewise, Graf and Schacter (1985) found a larger priming effect on a word-fragment completion task when college students and patients with amnesia were primed with a word from a word pair on a prior study list (same context condition) than with other words (different context condition), but this difference emerged only when the study task required elaborative processing. More recently, however, Allen and Jacoby (1990) determined that the priming effect on a perceptual identification test was equivalent whether test words had been generated during study (i.e., were easily recognized) or only read (i.e., were poorly recognized). Changes in the modality of presentation (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987) , the visual display of the target stimuli (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981 ) , the environmental setting of encoding and retrieval (Graf, 1988; Smith, Heath, & Vela, 1990) , the perceived sense or meaning of a word (Lewandowsky, Kirsner, & Bainbridge, 1989) , and mood (Macaulay et al., 1993) have also been found to disrupt memory performance on implicit tests.
In studies with infants, we have defined a training event as consisting of the focal cue (either the mobile or train) and the context in which training occurs (either the immediate visual surround, created by draping a colored-and-patterned cloth over the sides of the crib or playpen, or a room in the house). We have repeatedly found that changing the immediate visual surround impairs both delayed recognition and memory reactivation at 3 and 6 months Butler & Rovee-Collier, 1989; . Likewise, changing the room at the time of a reactivation treatment completely precludes memory reactivation in the mobile paradigm at 3 months (Hayne, Rovee-Collier, & Borza, 1991 ) and in the train paradigm at 6 months (Hartshorn & Rovee-Collier, 1997) . A room change also impairs the delayed recognition of older infants in the train task but only after relatively long delays, when the training memory is presumably weaker. At both 9 and 12 months of age, for example, a room change does not impair performance on a delayed-recognition test 4 weeks after training, but it does impair recognition after the longest delay that infants remember the task (6 weeks at 9 months, 8 weeks at 12 months). In contrast, a change in the focal cue impairs recognition after both test delays at each age (Aaron, Hartshorn, Klein, Ghumman, & Rovee-Collier, 1995) .
The deleterious effect of a context change on delayed recognition at 3 and 6 months of age can be overridden by explicitly training infants in a different context in each session (Amabile & Rovee-Collier & DuFault, 1991 ) --a condition like that which has long been known to override the debilitating effect of a context change on adults' recall (Pan, 1926) . The same effect was found by briefly exposing 6-montholds to a different distinctive surround within a day of the end of training (Boller & Rovee-Collier, 1992; Boller et al., 1996) and, at 3 months, by repeatedly reactivating the original memory (Hitchcock & Rovee-Collier, 1996) . In the latter study, infants were initially reminded with the original mobile in the original context; only their second or third reactivation treatment occurred in a different context. During all subsequent reactivation treatments, the training memory was successfully primed in the different context, indicating that the original contextual attributes had become inaccessible after the first reactivation treatment. The memory could not be reactivated, however, by a different mobile unless it had been reactivated twice previously and a very long interval (5 weeks) had also elapsed since training was completed.
All of the preceding studies are consistent in documenting that the memory attributes representing contextual information become inaccessible before those that represent the focal cue (see also Riccio et al., 1992) .
Memory for Place
According to Nadel, Willner, and Kurz (1985) , "Virtually all learning during infancy is... independent of context" (p. 398). Their conclusion was based on (a) the assumption that the hippocampal formation, which mediates the representation of the environmental context in normal adults, is not functional in infancy; and (b) evidence that habits and skills, which are context free, are preserved in individuals with amnesia with hippocampal dysfunction.
Evidence that infants' memory performance in the mobile paradigm consists ofmore than a set of simple skills and habits was presented earlier in this article. Direct evidence that contradicts this conclusion, however, comes from reactivation studies with 3-and 6-month-olds who were trained with a particular mobile Hayne et al., 1991 ) or train set (Hartshorn & Rovee-Collier, 1997) in one room in their home and were reminded with the same mobile or train set in another room. At both ages, the reactivation treatment in the altered context was ineffective, indicating that information about the particular place where infants had learned the task was represented in the original training memory. At 3 months, a reactivation treatment was also ineffective when infants were trained in their crib in the bedroom and were reminded in exactly the same spot in the same room but in a portacrib (which is smaller and lower), or vice versa (Hayne et al., 1991 ) .
Data of this sort led Butler and Rovee-Collier (1989) to postulate a hierarchical attention-gating model of memory retrieval in which a perceptual match or mismatch between the most remote test context (and then between increasingly less remote levels of context) and the memory attributes representing the training context determines whether or not the memory will be retrieved. A mismatch at any level aborts the retrieval process at that point. Over the first postnatal year, however, this process apparently requires a smaller complement of contextual details (Aaron et al., 1995; Earley, Bhatt, & Rovee-Collier, 1995) .
I have speculated elsewhere (Rovee-Collier, 1996 ) that prior to the onset of independent locomotion, infants learn what events transpire in what places. Only after infants can crawl do they learn the spatial relations among those different places (i.e., a cognitive map)--information that is requisite for spatial navigation. This view distinguishes between place information, which is absolute knowledge, and relational information about the spatial layout. Nadel et al. (1985) did not make such a distinction. The infant data are compatible, however, with Nadel et al.'s description of how a cognitive map contributes to environmental recognition:
Upon entering a previously mapped environment, an organism identifies the place it is in by detecting a small set of things in a particular spatial arrangement. Appropriate spatial arrangements activate enough elements in one particular map ensemble to initiate place recognition. This recognition process.., disposes the organism to interpret or act upon the environment in certain ways, reflecting the "expectations" embodied in the environment-specific activation .... In the complete absence of the hippocampal system, organisms seem oblivious to the familiarity/unfamiliarity of environments. (p. 391)8
Clearly, either the hippocampal formation matures earlier than Nadel et al. thought, or some other part of the brain mediates the representation of place information early in development.
Memory for a Specific Prior Episode:
Deferred Imitation Revisited Some researchers have claimed that the deferred-imitation task, in which nonverbal infants are exposed on a single occasion to an adult demonstrating several target actions, provides evidence of deliberate, conscious recall and explicit (declarative) memory (Bauer, 1996; Bauer & Hertsgaard, 1993; J. M. Mandler, 1988 McDonough et al., 1995) . J. M. Mandler (1990) , for example, concluded that because adults use recall to solve the deferred-imitation task, its solution by nonverbal infants must also require conscious awareness. Bauer (1996) similarly concluded that, unlike other changes in nonverbal behavior from which memory is inferred, conscious recollection can unambiguously be inferred from infants' performance in the deferred-imitation task because it "engages the same cognitive processes as those involved in verbal recall by older children and adults" (p. 31). McDonough (quoted in B. Bower, 1995, p. 86) claimed that "deferred imitation relies on brain structures essential for declarative memory, the capacity for intentionally calling to mind specific facts and events."
The latter claim was based on the finding that healthy adults and patients with frontal-lobe damage could reproduce correct action sequences after delays of 1 day and 3 months after seeing them demonstrated on a single occasion, but individuals with amnesia performed at control levels on a similar test (McDonough et al., 1995) . Because ll-month-old infants had performed similarly in the deferred-imitation task in an earlier study, McDonough characterized the results from the McDonough et al. study with adults with normal memory and individuals with amnesia as "the first solid evidence that infants consciously remember what they have learned ....
But our data don't address whether infants consciously remember where and when they learned the same information... " (quoted in B. Bower, 1995, p. 86) . Unfortunately, these claims and the evidence for them are based on two unacceptable inferences: (a) that any conclusions at all can be drawn about the capacities or the abilities of nonverbal infants from a study with adults with normal memory or otherwise, and (b) that there is a one-to-one mapping of a particular task (here, the deferred-imitation task) to an underlying memory system (here, the explicit or declarative memory system). Jacoby (1991) characterized the latter inference as "more than a little shaky" and observed that the "use of memory for a prior episode as a source of automatic influences . . . does not imply that one can or does recollect that prior episode" (p. 534; see also Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982) . Tulving (1990) similarly warned that conscious recollection cannot be inferred from performance on an explicit memory test because conscious experience and such behavior are not necessarily related. In fact, there is no direct evidence of conscious awareness in deferred-imitation experiments with preverbal infants (see also Fagan, 1990; Thompson, 1990; Werker, 1990) , and memory studies with adults offer no direct insights into the basis of memory performance of nonverbal infants.
The same researchers have also claimed that the fact that preverbal infants can display deferred imitation of action sequences after a single exposure, with no opportunity for practice prior to the test, distinguishes it from the memory performance of preverbal infants in delayed-recognition studies, which they nonselectively attribute to an implicit or nondeclarative memory system (Bauer, 1996; Bauer & Hertsgaard, 1993; J. M. Mandler, 1984 J. M. Mandler, , 1988 McDonough et al., 1995; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) . This position was summarized by Bauer (1996): What tasks that tap declarative memory have in common is that they require recollection of a specific episode. In contrast, what tasks that tap nondeclarative memory have in common is that recollection of a specific episode is not required, and in most cases (priming being an exception), learning proceeds gradually, as a result of repeated practice. (p. 31 )
In the mobile paradigm, however, even 3-month-olds can perform an action on an object on the basis of a single prior exposure with no opportunity for practice prior to testing (Greco et al., 1990; . In a prototypic study, infants were exposed to stained-glass-and-metal wind chime that was being jiggled by the experimenter for 3 min . This occurred on only a single occasion, 4 days after infants had learned to kick to move yellow-block mobiles that displayed As or 2s on all sides of each block. When presented with a stationary wind chime during a delayed-recognition test 1-10 days later (i.e., 5-14 days after the end of mobile training), infants kicked vigorously, apparently attempting to move it with the same response they had previously used to move the yellow-block mobiles. Their memory performance depended solely on having previously seen that the wind chime could move; infants who viewed a stationary wind chime did not kick during the test (Greco et al., 1990; Rovee-Collier, GrecoVigorito, et al., 1993) .
Because infants had never previously moved the wind chime by kicking, it cannot be argued that they were simply running off a stimulus-response habit that they had acquired gradually or incrementally through reinforced or repeated practice (Bachevalier, 1990; Bachevalier & Mishkin, 1984; Bauer, 1996; Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) . On the contrary, these infants merely applied an action that was already in their behavioral repertoire upon the test object in order to make it function as, on a single prior occasion, they had seen it could.
No perceptual information about its function was available at the time of testing. As in the deferred-imitation paradigm, neither the target action nor its consequence was physically present to be recognized at the time of the test (see Bauer, 1996; J. M. Mandler, 1984, p. 79, and 1990, p. 491 ) . Also as in the deferredimitation paradigm, the experimenter provides the infant with the "props" (e.g., a mobile, the context) in lieu of instructions, thereby creating an occasion for cued recall, but the specific action to be performed is not externally cued. This was especially apparent in the experiments of Timmons ( 1994, described below in Associative Relations), in which infants learned two different responses to two different cues prior to testing.
The major difference between the deferred imitation and the mobile passive-exposure study is that infants in the mobile study observed an object action instead of an experimenter action. Because they associated the wind chime with the training mobile only if they had seen the wind chime in motion, the functional similarity of the wind chime to the training mobile was clearly the basis for their performance on the delayed-recognition test. Also, because both adults and infants had psychophysically scaled the wind chime as "highly physically different" from the training mobiles, infants' response to the wind chime could not have been based on a generalized response to a similar object form (see also The Structural Descriptions System and Infant Memory, next).
In another study, infants' delayed recognition was also based on what they merely witnessed during a single prior episode. Hayne et al. (1993) trained 3-month-olds in their home cribs for three sessions with a different mobile in each session. During Session 3 only, a blue-and-red-striped cloth was draped around the sides of the crib. When Session 3 was over, the ankle ribbon was detached from the overhead suspension hook and the training mobile was removed, but then the stationary wind chime was merely hung from the hook for 3 min while the blue-andred-striped context was still in place. On the following day, infants received a standard delayed-recognition test 24 h later with the stationary wind chime in the absence of the blue-andred-striped context. Even though the distinctive context was not present at the time of testing, infants kicked robustly, apparently trying to move the wind chime, even though they had never before seen it move. A control group, treated exactly like the experimental group except that the distinctive blue-and-redstriped cloth was not present either during the third training session or when the wind chime was exposed, did not recognize the wind chime (i.e., kick) during the ensuing test. Hayne et al. (1993) concluded that the representation of the wind chime had been integrated with the infants' prior training memory via the common distinctive context that was present on only a single prior occasion--during their final training session and during their subsequent exposure to the wind chime. Here, the context acted in the manner of a catalyst: It was necessary in order for the initial integration of the two events, but it was no longer necessary (e.g., for subsequent memory performance) once the integration had occurred. This study unambiguously demonstrates that infants' performance during the 24-hr delayed-recognition test resulted from the retrieval of their memory for a specific prior episode. The infants' delayed-recognition behavior fully satisfies the description put forth by Nadel et al. (1985) for an internal model representing connections among contextual elements (see also Hayne & Findlay, 1995 ) . As with deferred imitation, however, this result offers no evidence that infants consciously recollected that particular prior episode.
In summary, in both delayed-recognition and deferred-imitation tasks, infants have been presented with an object that they saw in a single prior episode. This object cues retrieval of the memory of that episode, enabling infants to perform the target action upon it. Whether infants in either task are consciously aware of having previously seen the object can only be inferred from their behavior (J. M. Mandler, 1990) ; nothing in their test performance supports such an inference (Thompson, 1990) . The fact that infants' delayed recognition was based on a specific prior episode also yields no insights into the brain mechanisms responsible for their performance (see McDonough, quoted in B. Bower, 1995) . The fact that even 6-month-olds, if given a long enough exposure to the demonstrator, can imitate three specific actions that they only watched on a single occasion 24 hr earlier (Barr et al., 1996) challenges the functional significance of describing memory development in terms of the sequential maturation of two separable memory systems.
The Structural Descriptions System and Infant Memory
Several years ago, Schacter introduced the structural descriptions system as a subsystem of implicit memory (Schacter, 1990; Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990) . This is a perceptual representation system dedicated to the representation of information about the form and structure of visual objects, including a description of an object's plane of orientation about a central axis (Cooper, Schacter, & Moore, 1991 ) but not its size . This system also includes no semantic information about either the functions that an object can perform or its associative properties. The dominant paradigm for evaluating memory performance mediated by this system is the object decision task, in which individuals make perceptual decisions about the test stimuli, such as whether or not a particular drawing could possibly exist as a three-dimensional object Schacter et al., 1990; Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, et al., 1991) . The research findings demonstrate the familiar memory dissociation: Priming is preserved for both novel and familiar (Cave & Squire, 1992) objects, but recognition memory is impaired (Biederman & Cooper, 1992; .
Because the structural descriptions system is cast as a subsystem of implicit memory (Schacter, 1990) , it is presumed to be present quite early in development. In view of its other characteristics, however, the. structural descriptions system cannot account for evidence that object function (Greco et al., 1990) and object size (Gerhardstein et al., 1996) affect the delayed recognition of infants as young as 3 months and that associations between memories (Timmons, 1994) affect the memory performance of infants as young as 6 months. The evidence pertaining to object function and associations between memories is described below; evidence pertaining to object size was described previously (Studied Size).
Object Function
A mobile that infants previously learned to move by kicking is an effective reminder in a reactivation task if it is moving but not if it is stationary (Fagen, Yengo, Royce-Collier, & Enright, 1981; Greco et al., 1990 ; see also Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984) . In a delayed-recognition task, however, the same mobile cues retrieval when it is stationary. This difference probably reflects the fact that fewer or different cues are needed to retrieve memories that are more accessible (Rovee-Collier, Schechter, Shyi, & Shields, 1992; Spear, 1978) . Information about object function is not requisite for memory reactivation, however, if the cue that is used as a reminder was originally nonfunctional. The original training context obviously did not move, for example, yet it is an effective reminder for the training memory when presented alone, in the absence of the original training mobile (Hayne & Findlay, 1995; Rovee-Collier, Griesler, & Earley, 1985) .
Additional evidence that object function plays a critical role in infant memory comes from studies involving the passiveexposure procedure. In this procedure, mentioned in the preceding section, infants are merely exposed to (i.e., do not interact with) a novel object that is functioning as their prior training mobile had functioned. The exposure is brief--only 3 min for 3-month-olds and only 2 min for 6-month-olds--and occurs only once after posttraining delays that can be as long as days or weeks. Infants then receive a delayed-recognition test, also after delays that can be as long as days or weeks, in which either the training mobile or the exposed object is presented as the retrieval cue. 9 The passive-exposure procedure has revealed that infants' memories are readily modified or updated to include the exposed object in addition to (memory expansion) or in place of (memory impairment) the original mobile (Boiler, Grabelle, & RoveeCollier, 1995; Boiler et al., 1996; Muzzio & Rovee-Collier, 1996; Rovee-Collier et al., 1994; Rovee-Collier, Borza, et al., 1993;  for review, see , despite the fact that infants do not respond to a novel test mobile otherwise. This updating occurs even if the exposed object and the prior training mobile are highly physically dissimilar, as long as they are functionally equivalent. Passive exposure to the novel object in the absence of equivalent functional information does not affect the prior training memory (unless another common attribute mediates their integration; Hayne et al., 1993) , and infants continue to discriminate the novel object during the delayedrecognition test Greco et al., 1990) .
Associative Relations
A number of theorists have proposed that items are stored in a memory network and connected to each other by links (e.g., Collins, 1975; Collins & Quillian, 1969) . According to spreading-activation models, the presentation of a retrieval cue activates a memory at a particular node in the network; as this excitation spreads to nodes that are linked to the original one, they are activated as well. As a result, memories associated with nodes indirectly activated in this fashion also become more accessible. Timmons (1994) obtained evidence that infants form associations between independent memories by 6 months of age. In an initial study, she trained infants to either move a mobile suspended over the playpen or turn on a music box affixed to the playpen rail by either arm pulling or foot kicking--an analog of the traditional paired-associate task used in studies of adult verbal learning and memory. Infants were trained in a distinctive context for 2 days with one cue-response pair; 3 days later, they learned the other cue-response pair in the same context. Three days after learning the second pair, independent groups received a delayed-recognition test with one of the cues. During testing, infants produced only the particular response that had originally been associated with a given cue, regardless of which action it was (arm movement, foot kick) and which response was learned last. This result confirmed that the memories of the cue-response pairs were independent and that the retrieval of each response was specific to its associated cue.
In a second experiment, Timmons (1994) trained infants as before. Three weeks after training on the second pair, when both of the training memories had been forgotten, she exposed infants either to the mobile or the music box as a memory prime in a reactivation task. During testing the next day, she presented only the mobile as the retrieval cue to all infants. As expected, infants who were both reminded and tested with the mobile exhibited the mobile-appropriate response. Surprisingly, however, infants who were primed with the music box and tested with the mobile also exhibited the mobile-appropriate response--and no other--to the mobile test cue (see Figure 17) .
For the latter infants, the mobile memory had not been directly primed with the mobile and was clearly forgotten when their music box memory had been primed with the music box. Timmons (1994) concluded, therefore, that the music box prime had indirectly activated the memory node representing the mobile paired associate through spreading activation, thereby enabling infants to perform the mobile-appropriate response to the mobile cue 24 hr later. Thus, even though the memories of the two cue-response pairs were independent and highly specific, 9A novel context has also been used in the passive-exposure procedure. 
Mobile

Music Box
Reactivation Cue Figure 17 . Associative priming exhibited by 6-month-olds who originally learned to perform different responses to a mobile and to a music box cue. The forgotten memories of the two experimental groups were primed by either a mobile or a music box reminder 3 weeks after training, and both groups were tested only with the mobile 1 day later• The control group received no reactivation treatment. The magnitude of reactivation was the same whether reactivation was direct (Mobile) or indirect (Music Box). The baseline ratio was calculated by the formula B/A + B. Asterisks mark groups that displayed retention (baseline ratio > .50), where B = infant's kick rate during the long-term retention test; A = infant's level of learning. Data are from Timmons (1994) .
they were associatively linked--probably via the common context in which both pairs were acquired--in a common mnemonic network. As a result, reactivating one memory brought to mind the memory of the other. According to J. M. Mandler (1984) , recall "can occur incidentally through a process of being reminded• We are not trying to retrieve a piece of information, but an external or internal cue automatically brings it to our awareness... [without] a deliberate search taking place" (pp. 79-80). In fact, excluding "awareness," her description exactly fits Timmons' data. Sheffield and Hudson (1994) similarly observed an indirect reactivation phenomenon in a memory study with 14-to 18-month-old toddlers. Using a multiple-activities paradigm, they allowed toddlers to engage in six different structured activities at different stations in the laboratory. After toddlers' memory of their visit had been forgotten, they retumed to the laboratory, and half of the activities were modeled by the experimenter while the children merely watched. Twenty-four hours later, the children were asked to produce the three activities they had not seen modeled plus the three that they had. As expected, children of the same age who had viewed the modeling but had not been originally trained produced only the three activities they had seen modeled the day before, and children who had been originally trained but had not received the reactivation treatment (the modeling) produced none. However, children who had been originally trained and had also seen three activities modeled as a reminder produced the three modeled activities as well as the three activities that had not been modeled• As in the Timmons (1994) study, directly reactivating some activities led to the indirect reactivation of others--again, probably mediated by the common context in which the activities had originally been performed. Clearly, then, associative-memory priming is not unique to the mobile task; it also can be observed with older infants in a paradigm that involves no preconditioning of the target response whatsoever.
The preceding evidence demonstrates that object function affects memory performance by 3 months of age and that associations between memories affect memory performance by 6 months of age. Yet, these variables are thought to be the sole domain of the explicit memory system, not the implicit memory system (Schacter, 1990) .
Are Infants and Other Nonverbal Organisms
Consciously Aware?
To reiterate, the defining characteristic of an explicit memory system--conscious awareness--cannot be directly measured in infants and other nonverbal organisms. To quote Olton (1989) , "the absence of proof.., is not proof of absence" (p. 167). The question of whether organisms other than linguistically competent humans possess conscious awareness has vexed philosophers since the time of the ancient Greeks. The issue was temporarily resolved in the 17th century by the cartesian distinction between mind versus matter. The recent introduction of the explicit versus implicit memory dichotomy with emphasis on conscious awareness has reinvigorated advocates of dualism as well as its critics. In considering how consciousness should be defined, the philosopher John Searle (1995) suggested a commonsense rather than an analytic definition:
"Consciousness" refers to those states of sentience and awareness that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue until we go to sleep again, or fall into a coma or die or otherwise become "unconscious." (p. 60) He argued that conscious experiences are emergent properties of neurobiological processes in the brain--an approach that places consciousness squarely in the realm of other ordinary biological phenomena such as physiological thermoregulation, mitosis, and digestive processes (Searle, 1984 (Searle, , 1995 . This argument echoes Hubbard's (1975) conclusion that mental phenomena are direct consequences of neural activity. Although Searle (1983) argued that brain processes cause consciousness, he viewed it as simply a feature of the brain, just as the solidity of a table is a feature of the table's molecular structure: "mental states are both caused by the operations of the brain and realized in the structure of the brain" (p. 265). Tulving (1987) , however, insisted that the "problem of consciousness and memory is different from problems of consciousness with which many generations of thinkers have wrestled • . . problems such as what consciousness is, and how it emerges from the physical-chemical brain activity" (p. 75). He argued that the problem of conscious awareness "concerns the selective but systematic occurrence of conscious awareness in remembering, as well as in other mental activities" (Tulving, 1987, p. 75 ) . Although Tulving's distinction between consciousness and conscious awareness has intuitive appeal, he offered no operational definition for it (see also Shapiro & Olton, 1994, p. 108) .
More than 2 decades ago, a parallel issue arose in the field of animal communication. At that time, the common criterion for distinguishing animal from human language was the assumption that animals lacked both conscious awareness of their own mental experiences (if they had any) and a conscious intent to communicate (e.g., Terwilliger, 1968) . Griffin (1976) , however, characterized this assumption as antagonistic to the "general principle of evolutionary kinship and continuity" between animals and men. He argued,
The hypothesis that some animals are indeed aware of what they do, and of internal images that affect their behavior, simplifies our view of the universe by removing the need to maintain an unparsimonious assumption that our species is qualitatively unique in this important attribute. (Griffin, 1976, p. 101) Like Searle (1995) , Griffin proposed that mental experiences are directly linked to neurophysiological processes that are highly similar in all multicellular animals. Indeed, this is a plausible hypothesis (Griffin, 1976 ). Perhaps we should similarly simplify our view of the universe and either assume that preverbal infants and animals are consciously aware or eliminate conscious awareness as a defining characteristic of explicit memory.
Conclusion
There is no empirical evidence that the implicit and explicit memory systems follow a hierarchical developmental sequence, with the implicit memory system maturing early in the 1st year and the explicit memory system maturing late in the 1st year. On the contrary, evidence collected directly from infants reveals that they display the same memory dissociations as adults in response to the same independent variables on tasks analogous to those used to distinguish these systems. Moreover, data collected in the delayed-recognition paradigm over the first 18 months of life (see Figure 4 ) reveal a striking developmental continuity over a period previously thought to be marked by discontinuities of one sort or another, including the emergence of explicit memory and language. This continuity in infants' delayed recognition is independent of task and response system (Hartshorn & Rovee-Collier, 1997; Hartshorn et al., in press ). Taken together, infants' memory dissociations and the developmental continuity in their memory performance reveal that the assumption that the implicit and explicit memory systems mature at different rates during the 1st year of life is fundamentally incorrect. If there indeed are two memory systems, then they develop simultaneously and not sequentially from early in life. Crowder (1988) argued that the important question is not whether different tasks and different independent variables yield dissociations but what such dissociations portend regarding the question of underlying memory systems. Murdock (1988) noted that although experimental dissociations might be expected if there are separate and distinct underlying memory systems, the finding of experimental dissociations does not confirm that they actually exist. A similar argument was made by Olton (1989) , who took issue with the fact that most double dissociations, which are often taken as evidence of functional dissociations and dichotomies in neuropsychological experiments, have been obtained with only a single set of parameters. After demonstrating how different levels of a variable such as task demand can lead to different outcomes with different interpretations, he concluded that such data "are not capable of proving a dichotomy at any level of analysis" (Olton, 1989, p. 163 ) and proposed that theories of memory should emphasize dimensions rather than dichotomies.
In fact, the dissociations in infants' memory performance in the reactivation and delayed-recognition tasks are conducive to an analysis of this sort. The long recognition latencies at 3 and 6 months clearly demonstrate that reactivation (priming) is strictly a perceptual identification process that proceeds more or less automatically, much like parallel processing (see also Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981 ) . The reactivation or priming task reveals what of the information that was originally encoded is still available in memory (see also Treisman, 1992) . What the delayed-recognition task entails is a more difficult problem and one with which I, like Olton and numerous other researchers, have wrestled for some time. In general, I find it useful to conceptualize of memory in terms of a series of processing stages. This succession of stages necessarily begins with perceptual processing because what is perceived (i.e., encoded) provides the data upon which the memory processes operate. The delayed-recognition task must reveal the product of subsequent processing stages in which information that is perceived at the time of testing is integrated with previous memory tokens that have been retrieved into short-term or working memory and given meaning (for discussion, see Rovee-Collier, 1995, and Rovee-Collier, Borza, et al., 1993) . By this very sketchy account, reactivation or priming reflects one extreme of a memoryprocessing continuum, and delayed recognition reflects a point near, but perhaps not yet at, the other extreme. By this account, a memory failure could reflect a disruption of processing at any of several points along this continuum.
Whatever account of memory processing ultimately proves to be most satisfactory, accounts based on simple dichotomies are bound to be wrong. Most certainly, they are unlikely to capture the richness of representational systems or processes that have evolved in different species under different selection pressures (Oakley, 1983; Sherry & Schacter, 1987) . Roediger (1990) speculated that five major systems and 20 subsystems, at a minimum, would be necessary to accomplish this, and Johnson ( 1983 Johnson ( , 1992 proposed a unitary memory system (multiple-entry modular system or MEM) with 16 subsystems or modules to account for the many varieties of memory. The popularity of simple dichotomies is likely to persist for some time, however, because dichotomies, like two-way interactions, are easier to contemplate than systems or subsystems entailing 16-or 20-way interactions, or more.
To summarize, this article presented evidence collected in studies with preverbal infants that refutes the notion that two separable and functionally distinct memory systems mature at different rates during the 1st year of life. The core argument was that very young infants exhibit memory dissociations that resemble those exhibited by adults with normal memory on memory tasks that are used to distinguish these systems. The data demonstrate that implicit and explicit memory develop simultaneously rather than sequentially in infancy and challenge the utility of conscious recollection as a defining characteristic of explicit memory.
Cognitive neuroscience is currently poised to move beyond the level of simple classification and seek the actual mechanisms that underlie memory performance. The robust experimental dissociations and the developmental continuity in the memory performance of preverbal infants point to the infancy period as a promising place to begin the search.
